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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The purpose of the study 
 
Trade remedy laws are exceptions to a country’s core obligations, when there is proof that 
domestic injury has taken place, and that they have the effect of restricting imports.
1
 Safeguard 
measures, countervailing duties, and anti-dumping laws traditionally make up the three types of 
trade remedies. However, a difference exists between the three which should be noted. Anti-
dumping and countervailing duties are measures to remedy unfair trade whereas, safeguards are 
duties imposed in relation to fair trade conditions when there are sudden surges in imports. 
Imports are generally not bad, they can give consumers access to cheaper, better quality goods, 
they can provide domestic producers with inputs that may allow them to compete more 
effectively in world markets and through competition can spur domestic producers to be more 
efficient.  
 
But sometimes industries need protection to meet unfair competition or more generally to adjust 
to competition. That is why countries have contingent trade protection. Anti-dumping duties are 
nonetheless the most preferred trade remedy and therefore mostly used. They are tariffs added to 
ordinary custom duties that are imposed to counteract alleged ‘unfair’ pricing behaviour by 
private firms that injure or threaten to cause material injury to a competing industry in an 
importing country.
2
 When implemented by the importing country, they place both the domestic 
and foreign producers in the same market on an equal footing, thereby promoting fair trade and 
enhancing economic growth.
3
   
                                                             
1 Raslān A Anti-dumping: A Developing Country Perspective (2009)4. 
2 Skyes A ‘Trade Remedy Laws’ available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/240.aos_.trade-remedy.pdf  
(accessed 17 January2013). 
3 Denner W Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa-Review of Select Issues: Protectionism, 
Trade Remedies and Safeguards (2010) 3. 
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When liberalisation of economies began, many countries intended to exploit the opportunities of 
free trade while at the same time making no compromises on the welfare of their domestic 
industries.
4
  In the early stages of international trade, however, pressure was exerted by the local 
industries for protection which resulted in the enactment of anti-dumping (AD) legislation: 
Canada was the first in 1904, followed by New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and finally the 
United States of America (USA). Although anti-dumping laws were introduced, they were not 
equally utilised by all countries. For example, the USA used tariffs mainly to regulate imports, 
while Australia, South Africa, and Canada used the AD instrument.
5
   
 
An attempt to deal with AD at the international level began in the early 1920s, when the League 
of Nations began to study dumping and differential prices. It, however, was not able to produce 
any rules, with respect to dumping.
6
   In 1946, the USA proposed the creation of international 
rules to administer AD measures and it was successful as international provisions were 
incorporated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the form of Article (Art) 
VI.
 7
  
 
This Article is the international AD rule. It contains provisions dealing with anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy, but those relating to dumping are: the meaning of ‘dumping’, how to offset 
dumping, and the relationship between anti-dumping and anti-subsidy.
8
  One must note, 
however, that even though Art VI was in existence, there were still some loopholes. It could not 
answer some very important questions, such, as how to establish ‘dumping’, ‘injury’, or 
‘causation’, or any other procedures for that matter. To improve this situation, several Rounds of 
negotiations were conducted which included: the Kennedy Round (1967), the Tokyo Round 
(1979) and the Uruguay Round (1994).
9
   
                                                             
4
 Raju K World Trade Organisation Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WT and Indian Legal Jurisprudence 
(2008) 2. 
5
 Raslān A Anti-dumping: A Developing Country Perspective (2009) 3; Raju K World Trade Organisation 
Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WT and Indian Legal Jurisprudence (2008) 1. 
6
 Terrence P The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1994) 22. 
7
 Raslān A Anti-dumping: A Developing Country Perspective (2009) 4. 
8
 See Art VI of the GATT 1994. 
9
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti dumping Measures 
(2003)8. 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 3  
 
This last Round was the most important and comprehensive as its conclusion led to the creation 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the conclusion of a new agreement to implement 
Art VI. The WTO agreement was called the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).
10
  
 
On a multilateral level, these two instruments make provision for the implementation of AD 
measures, and their governance of these AD measures at the international level prevents abuse of 
this instrument to block imports.
11
  The ADA provides comprehensive substantive rules on how 
to determine dumping and lays down procedures on how anti-dumping investigations are to be 
initiated, and the manner in which they should be conducted and terminated. It is important to 
note that although the ADA provides the general framework that regulates the use of anti-
dumping, Members are free to implement their national anti-dumping policies on condition that 
their rules are in conformity with the ADA, with any changes in the laws relevant to the 
Agreement being notified to the WTO;
12
 and in addition, the WTO committee on anti-dumping 
practices must be informed about all the preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly 
and in detail.
13
  
 
Before 1980, there were only very few countries utilising national anti-dumping laws, commonly 
known as the ‘traditional users’. However, after this period there was a rapid increase and many 
nations, especially developing ones, began adopting anti-dumping laws since the old users had 
ceased monopolising protectionism.
14
 Although developing countries are using anti-dumping 
laws to a greater extent now more than ever, so far African countries have not played a major 
role in this area. Egypt, South Africa, Morocco and recently Mauritius are the only countries 
with functional anti-dumping mechanisms and have used them to defend their local industries.
15
   
 
                                                             
10
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti dumping Measures 
(2003) 9. 
11
 Raslān A Anti-dumping: A Developing Country Perspective (2009)2. 
12
Denner W Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa-Review of Select issues: Protectionism, 
Trade Remedies and Safeguards (2010) 5. 
13
 See Art16.4 of the ADA. 
14
Zanardi M &Vandenbussche H ‘What Explains the Proliferation of Anti-dumping Laws?’ available at 
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2007-27.pdf (accessed 22 May 2013). 
15
 Illy O ‘Trade Remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges, and Prospects’ Working Paper available at 
http://ebookbrowse.com/illy-trade-remedies-in-africa-pdf-d370532454  (accessed 7 October 2012). 
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In February 2011, the Kenyan Trade Minister stated that a Bill on the implementation of the 
WTO agreements on anti-dumping was expected to be tabled in Parliament, and which would 
protect the local industries which had been forced to shut down due to unfair trade practices.
16
  
Kenya is one of the developing countries that desires and is in the process of drafting its first 
anti-dumping legislation, and set up investigating authorities to enable it to be in a position to 
take measures to offset the material injury caused by dumping to its domestic industry.  
 
The three most affected sub-sectors are wheat, sugar and textiles which have experienced a 
myriad of problems as a result of dumping. For example, in all these sub-sectors, we find: heavy 
financial losses have been suffered by the producers, a shift to other activities or loss of jobs by 
employees, disillusionment, an increase in poverty, and eventual shutting down as a result of 
huge imports of sub-standard dumped goods.
17
  Currently, the only provisions dealing with 
dumping in Kenya are found in the Customs and Excise Act
18
  but they have not been utilised 
because to a large extent they are not in harmony with the WTO’s ADA and therefore to impose 
anti-dumping measures under these laws will result in a dispute at the WTO. The inadequacy of 
the framework has hampered the investigation of the dumping of imported goods and its effect 
on the local producers. This is a deprivation of their rights under the WTO. It is important for 
Kenya to respect WTO rules, not only to avoid dispute settlement, but because the rules-based 
system will also protect Kenyan exporters from abuse of trade remedies in other countries.     
 
South Africa is known as one of the traditional and prolific users of anti-dumping laws as well as 
a strict adherent to the requirements of Art VI and the ADA.
19
  It has the following domestic 
rules that govern anti-dumping: the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (ITAA), 
the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, and the Anti-Dumping Regulations (ADR) which are 
used by the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) while carrying out 
                                                             
16
 http://www.antidumping/kenya to table bill on WTO rules on antidumping, subsidies-export.by information export 
support website (accessed 25 September 2012). 
17 
http://www.antidumping/kenya to table bill on WTO rules on antidumping, subsidies-export.by information export 
support website (accessed 25 September 2012). 
18 The Customs and Excise Act Cap 472. 
19
 Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping Measures in Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005)53. 
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investigations.
20
  Due to its adherence to the WTO rules, its anti- dumping experience has been 
considered a success in its participation in the global trading system.  
 
This study comes at a crucial turning point when Kenya has decided to harmonise its national 
laws not only with those of the WTO but also of the Common Market for East and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) in order to enable it to enforce its 
anti-dumping laws.
21
  Therefore, this mini-thesis seeks to investigate the concept of dumping 
under the WTO framework, which will entail looking into both the substantive and procedural 
provisions and their application to gain an understanding into what is expected from Members 
who intend using this tool and will be the basis for an anti-dumping regime in Kenya. 
  
An attempt will also be made by this research to examine how South Africa has structured its 
legal and institutional framework to deal with dumping, its strengths and weaknesses, and what 
Kenya can learn from SA to ensure effective protection for its industries. The survival of 
Kenya’s domestic industries and producers under the pressures of lowering tariffs and dumping 
is greatly at stake today, and it will continue; hence the urgent need to devise strategies to defend 
the remaining local industries and to promote new ones.
22
  That said, it is hoped that the parties 
involved with the drafting of the Kenyan laws will be provided with adequate information 
necessary for the effective implementation of the anti-dumping rules.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The main questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: 
 
a) What is dumping under the WTO and what are the standards required for the utilisation 
and implementation of anti-dumping laws by a Member? 
b) Why is Kenya in need of a national anti-dumping framework? 
                                                             
20
 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa ‘available at  http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
21
http://www.antidumping/kenya to table bill on WTO rules on antidumping, subsidies-export.by information export 
support website (accessed 25 September 2012). 
22
 Illy O ‘Trade Remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges, and Prospects’ Working Paper available at 
http://ebookbrowse.com/illy-trade-remedies-in-africa-pdf-d370532454  (accessed 7 October 2012). 
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c) What lessons can another developing country in Africa, South Africa, with a successful 
anti-dumping experience, provide for a potential ‘new user’ like Kenya? 
d) What should Kenya do in order to produce an anti-dumping instrument that is wholly in 
compliance with its international obligations under the WTO?  
 
1.3 Scope and research methodology 
 
There are three trade restrictive measures a government can use: countervailing, safeguard and 
anti-dumping measures. This thesis only deals with anti-dumping in a market economy since 
Kenya is a market economy where production is based upon supply and demand unlike in a non-
market economy where government intervention is important in the allocation of resources and 
the determination of prices.
23
 China, for example, is a non-market economy.  
 
To delimit the research further, South Africa was used as the comparative case study bearing in 
mind that there are other countries, like Egypt, with functional anti-dumping regimes. The 
reasons for making South Africa the country of choice is, first, the fact that it stands out as an 
experienced country (since 1914) in dealing with dumping issues and it is  also the fifth largest 
user of anti-dumping actions after the United States of America (USA), the European Union 
(EU), India, and Argentina.
24
  Furthermore, its laws and enforcement mechanisms are clear, and 
transparent which has been made possible by adopting a bottom-up approach in its entire policy 
making process to ensure that the concerns of both private and public stakeholders are 
addressed.
25
  Lastly, the South African trade remedy mechanism is generally the most functional 
in Africa.
26
   
                                                             
23 The Free Dictionary available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/non-market+economy (accessed 20 May 
2013). 
24 Joubert N ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: The Reform of South Africa’s Anti-Dumping 
Regime’ available at http//www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case38_e.htm#remedies (accessed 25 
September 2012). 
25 Joubert N ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: The Reform of South Africa’s Anti-Dumping 
Regime’ available at http//www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case38_e.htm#remedies (accessed 25 
September 2012). 
26
 Illy O ‘Trade Remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges, and Prospects’ Working Paper available at 
http://ebookbrowse.com/illy-trade-remedies-in-africa-pdf-d370532454  (accessed 20 May 2012). 
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The method employed for this research is both desktop and library based. A wide and thorough 
review of available literature is made, including primary and secondary sources, and WTO texts, 
cases, agreements, and regulations governing dumping have been used as key sources. Relevant 
textbooks, scholarly articles, reports, databases, working papers, domestic case law, and 
legislation were also consulted. Electronic resources are also widely used for their wealth of 
information on dumping and anti-dumping in Kenya and South Africa which is not available in 
the other sources. 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is an introduction to the issue of dumping, 
focusing on the detailed rules of the ADA which set out the conditions under which WTO 
Members may apply anti-dumping measures as a remedy against injurious dumping in their 
domestic markets. An attempt is made to look into the substantive as well the procedural 
provisions with which WTO Members must comply. This lays the foundation for this mini-
thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the rationales for having a national anti-dumping instrument in Kenya and 
analyses the country’s national anti-dumping framework and its institutions. This partly justifies 
the relevance of the study and the use of anti-dumping laws. In addition, an insight into the legal 
frameworks of the EAC and the COMESA, with which Kenya aspires to be in harmony, is 
provided in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 critically analyses the legislative and institutional frameworks of the South African 
anti-dumping system, the substantive matters and procedures to be followed by interested parties 
throughout the investigation process, and the reviews available. In addition, there is an 
examination of some identified problems which restrict the proper effectiveness of this system. 
This chapter provides the South African approach, from which the Kenyan policy makers can 
learn as they undertake to draft their own laws. 
The fifth and last chapter draws conclusions and provides recommendations for both South 
Africa and Kenya. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF DUMPING UNDER THE 
WTO: RULES AND PROCEDURES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Dumping is regarded as unfair commercial competitive behaviour in international trade. By the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, countries, such as, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand and the 
USA, formulated and implemented national anti-dumping legislation to counterbalance the 
injury to their economies caused by foreign dumped products.
27
  The implementation of the anti-
dumping laws, however, went beyond its reasonable scope and extent and became a method of 
protecting trade, thus hindering the growth of international business. This crisis led many 
countries to seek international legislation as a means to bring anti-dumping in line with 
international trade requirements in order to limit this measure to its reasonable scope.
28
   
 
In 1994, with the inception of the WTO and the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) (negotiated 
during the Uruguay Round), comprehensive guidelines for countries to implement and 
administer anti-dumping laws were provided for.
29
  First, the ADA, being a multilateral 
agreement, was part of the single undertaking: it established a common set of basic rules that 
would apply to all WTO Members and is subject to the enforcement provisions of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
30
   
 
                                                             
27 Das S ‘Evolution and Political Economy of Trade Protectionism: Anti-dumping and Safeguard Measures’ 
(2005)17 IIBM Management Review 52; Tao M Dumping and AD Regulations with Specific Reference to the Legal 
Framework in SA and China (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Free State, 2006) 39. 
28 Denton R ‘Why Should Nations Utilize Anti-dumping Measures’ (1989) Journal of International Law 242-243. 
29 Viktoriia K  Public Interest Consideration in Domestic and International Anti-Dumping Disciplines (published 
LLM thesis, World Trade Institute, 2011) 6. 
30 Bown P ‘The WTO and Anti-dumping in Developing Countries’ (2007) Working Paper of the World Bank No: 
4014 , 7. 
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Secondly, in comparison to the GATT, the WTO ADA imposed more structure on the 
evidentiary requirements for a government to implement a new anti-dumping measure, although 
countries are allowed substantial discretion to implement their own anti-dumping laws consistent 
with the WTO rules.
31
  It is worth remembering that Art VI of the GATT 1947, (which lasted 
until 1994 when it was replaced by the WTO), already provided very general disciplines which 
were incrementally developed through the plurilateral Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds agreements 
before culminating in the WTO agreements. 
 
Since the 1990s many developing and developed countries have adopted anti-dumping 
legislation and applied anti-dumping measures. For example, South Africa, Brazil, India, Egypt, 
Argentina, Turkey and Mexico have initiated anti-dumping investigations.
32
   Miranda
33
 
articulates that nowadays as a result of these rules half the total number of anti-dumping cases 
initiated are by developing countries, some of which employ anti-dumping provisions more 
actively than most developed countries.  
 
This chapter discusses the global regulation of dumping, in accordance with WTO’s Art VI of 
the GATT 1994 and the ADA. It explains the substantive principles under the ADA (meaning of 
‘dumping’, the determination of dumping, injury and the causal link), the procedures for enacting 
anti-dumping measures, reviews, as well as the notification requirements to be complied with by 
Members with national anti-dumping laws. 
 
2.2 THE MEANING OF ‘DUMPING’ 
 
Jacob Viner first introduced and defined the idea of ‘dumping’ as ‘price discrimination between 
national markets’.34  According to the ADA, dumping occurs when a producer in one country 
sells a product at a lower price to a specific export market than the normal value.
35
  Normal value 
can be determined in different ways, but generally it is in relation to the price in the exporter’s 
                                                             
31 Art17.6 of  the ADA ; Bown P ‘The WTO and Anti-dumping in Developing Countries’ (2007) Working paper of 
the World Bank No: 4014, 7. 
32 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003) 46. 
33 Miranda J, Torres R & Ruiz M ‘The International Use of Anti-dumping’ (1998) Journal of World Trade  5. 
34 Viner J Dumping: A problem in International Trade (1923) 4. 
35 See Art 2.1 of the ADA. 
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domestic market.
36
  For instance, a two kg packet of chicken wings from country W is exported 
to country X (which also locally sells chicken wings) for US $5, while the price of the same 
wings in country W is US $10. The main aspect is that the company charges a different price in 
different markets for the same product, which amounts to price discrimination. It should be noted 
that for dumping to occur, unlike price discrimination, the market has to be international, 
between countries.
37
 
 
Is this behaviour outlawed under the WTO? Art VI of the GATT 1994 and the ADA do not 
prohibit dumping, but condemn that which causes material injury.
38
  
‘The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one country are 
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the 
products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established 
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a 
domestic industry’.39 
 
The ADA clarifies and expands Art VI, and the two operate together.
40
  If dumping injures the 
local producers of the importing country, its authorities are allowed to take measures to either 
offset or prevent injurious dumping.
41
 Countries are therefore permitted with a clear-cut 
guideline and rule based mechanism to act in a way that would normally breach the GATT 
principles of a binding tariff and non- discrimination between trade partners. The GATT only 
addresses the behaviour of governments, dumping by private companies or non- government 
organisations cannot be forbidden. Thus private firms have freedom of choice in business.
42
 
 
                                                             
36 See Art 2.2.1 of the ADA. 
37 Li W Anti-dumping Law of the WTO/GATT and the EC: Gradual Evolution of Anti-dumping Law in Global Econ 
Integration (2003)53-54. 
38United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)3. 
39Art VI: 1 of the GATT 1994. 
40 WTO E-Learning available at https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-
Print.pdf  (accessed 2 February 2013). 
41Denner W Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa-Review of Select Issues: Protectionism, 
Trade Remedies and Safeguards (2010)11; Art VI of the GATT 1994.  
42Jackson H The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO (2000) 73. 
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The GATT 1994 and the ADA Annex 1A cover agreements on trade in goods and thus only 
relate to dumping of goods. There are currently no rules relating to dumping of services, 
although a working part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) rules has been 
examining the issue almost since the WTO was created.
43
  There are various circumstances in 
which dumping of goods may take place.
44
  For example, sporadic dumping which is seen to be 
driven by the need to dispose of an excess supply of goods which occurs as a result of, for 
example, inexperience when pricing the product or demand changes for the product after its 
production.
45
    
 
Viner
46
 maintained that protection through an anti-dumping authority was needed against 
predatory dumping. In predatory dumping a new firm is motivated to participate in dumping so 
that it can gain access into a new market, or drive away domestic competitors from the market.
47
  
‘Predatory pricing’ therefore refers to cutting of prices in the short term so as to drive rivals out 
of the market and gain market power. All forms of dumping lead to ‘unfair’ competition which 
the ADA seeks to address.
48
 
 
2.3 DETERMINATION OF DUMPING IN A MARKET ECONOMY 
 
A national government must investigate and consider substantial evidence before imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping measure that restricts imports, under the ADA.
49
 The importing 
country’s authorities may impose anti-dumping duties to offset the effects of dumping after 
meeting the following requirements: proof that actual dumping is occurring, the domestic 
industry producing a like product suffers material injury or threat thereof, and the injury is the 
                                                             
43United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)3. 
44Bolton M ‘Anti-dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties under the WTO through Heightened 
Scrutiny’ (2012) Berkeley Journal of International Law vol 29, 72. 
45Beirwagen V, Rainer M, Hailbronner K ‘Input, Downstream, Upstream, Secondary, Diversionary and Components 
or Sub-assembly Dumping’ (1988) Journal of World Trade, 32 footnote 27. 
46Viner J Dumping: A Problem in International Trade (1923) 7. 
47 Venkatesh M Handbook on Anti-dumping (2001) 9. 
48 Venkatesh M Handbook on Anti-dumping (2001) 10. 
49Bown P ‘The WTO and Anti-dumping in Developing Countries’ (2007) Working paper of the World Bank No: 
4014 7. 
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result of dumped products from the specified country (causal link).
50
 The means of determining 
whether dumping has taken place is by providing the importing government’s anti-dumping 
authority with evidence that shows that the export price of the ‘like’ product is lower than the 
normal value.
51
 This is achieved by determining the like product’s export price (market of the 
importing country) and normal value (market of the exporting country), and comparing them.  
 
For example: if a German export company sold a motorcycle in the Kenyan market for Kshs 
2000 but it sold the same thing in Germany for Kshs 5000 this would mean the company is 
dumping in the Kenyan market. If the price in Germany for the same motorcycle was Kshs 2500, 
there would be no suggestion that dumping was taking place. In order to offset or prevent 
dumping Kenya may levy an anti-dumping duty in order to bring the price of the exported 
product to the level of the ‘normal value’, or to increase the export price to a level where it 
ceases to cause injury to the domestic industry of the importing country.
52
  It should be noted that 
this is a strict rule and the duty cannot be greater in amount than the dumping margin with 
respect to that product.
53
 
 
2.3.1 Normal value 
 
Is the ‘like product in the domestic market of the exporter’ relevant to the determination of 
dumping in an investigation? Yes, because this product gives the normal value. The ADA 
typically expresses the normal value as the price of the like product at which the exporter sells 
the product in his home market.
54
 Therefore, from the ‘motor cycle’ illustration above, the 
domestic price of the product is 5000 and its exporting price is 2000, the dumping amount is 
3000 and the dumping margin is 3000/2000x100= 150%.
55
 
 
How can ‘normal value’ be determined in a case where the product subject to investigation, the 
motor cycle, is not sold at all in Germany for a given reason or the sales in Germany are not in 
                                                             
50 See Art VI (6) (a) of the GATT 1994. 
51 See Art 2.1 of the ADA. 
52See Art 8.1of the ADA. 
53 See Art VI (2) of the GATT 1994. 
54 See Art 2.1 of the ADA. 
55Czako J, Human J & Miranda J A Handbook on Anti-dumping Investigations (2003)126 ; See Art 2.4.2 of the 
ADA. 
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the ordinary course of trade, or are less than five percent of export sales to Kenya (the importing 
country)?
56
  ‘Ordinary course of trade’ is not defined by the ADA; however, the following 
situations are sales not being in the ordinary course of trade: sales below cost, sales between 
related parties, liquidation sales, and sales to employees.
57
 
 
Two alternatives are available to calculate the normal value: 
 
 The price charged by the exporter in a third country, e.g. France. With this price, 
however, there are two conditions to be met: the export price is required to be 
‘representative’ and the third country should be ‘appropriate’.58 Thus the volume of 
exports to a given third country as against the volume of exports to the importing country 
is tested.
59
  If the volume sold to the third country is very low compared to the volume of 
exports to the importing Member, they may not select the sales to that third country as a 
basis for the determination of normal value.
60
 Essentially, most Member authorities have 
rarely relied on export prices to a third country to determine normal value for fear that 
sales to a third country might also be made at dumped prices; for instance, ball bearings 
from Japan have been dumped in the European Community, in the USA and Canada. 
61
 
 
 The constructed normal value.62  This is a value, as opposed to a price set by the exporter, 
requested by the importing Member’s authorities for the purpose of an anti-dumping 
investigation.
63
  It is obtained by adding the cost of production, a reasonable amount for 
selling, general and administrative costs and profits in order to check whether domestic 
sales are made below cost.
64
 The WTO panel in Guatemala-Cement II
65
 upheld this 
                                                             
56 See Art 2.2 of the ADA and Footnote 2 of the ADA. 
57 See Art 2.2.2(ii) of the ADA. 
58See Art 2.2 of the ADA. 
59WTO E-Learning available at https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-
Print.pdf (accessed 2 February 2013). 
60WTO E-Learning available at https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-
Print.pdf (accessed 2nd February 2013). 
61Stanbrook C& Bentley P Dumping and Subsidies: The Law and Procedures Governing the Imposition of Anti-
dumping and Countervail Duties in the European Community (1996)39. 
62See Art 2.2 of the ADA. 
63https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 2February 2013). 
64See Art 2.2 of the ADA. 
65Panel Report Guatemala-Cement II WT/DS156/R, 183.  
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practice by affirming that an investigative authority can request cost information, even if 
the applicant does not allege sales below cost. The ADA contains rules on how costs 
should be calculated.
66
  It also establishes a set of rules for the calculation of the selling, 
general and administrative costs, as well as profits.
67
 
 
2.3.2 Export price 
 
In order to find whether dumping occurred or not, the export price must be determined and 
compared with the normal value. Although the ADA does not define ‘export price’, it is 
construed to be the price payable for the product being exported from one country to another.
68
  
This price, which is normally specified in export documentation (e.g. bill of lading), is that of the 
allegedly dumped goods one of the two elements in a dumping determination.
69
 
 
In certain cases as recognised by the ADA, the export price may not be reliable, for example, 
where the exporter sells the product to a related importer.
70
  Hence, an alternative method of 
determining an appropriate export price for comparison is needed. The investigating authorities 
calculate a ‘constructed export price’ which is based on the price at which the imported products 
are first resold to an independent buyer. Nonetheless, if the imported product is not resold to an 
independent buyer, or is not resold as imported, the authorities may determine a reasonable basis 
on which to calculate the export price.
71
 It should be noted that Art 2.4 of the ADA, which 
governs the construction of the export price, authorises specific allowances for the costs, duties 
and taxes incurred between importation and resale to be made in the construction. This was held 
by the panel in the US & Stainless Steel case stating that Members should permit costs and 
profits when constructing an export price because a failure will only result in a higher export 
price and therefore a lower dumping margin.
72
 
                                                             
66See Art 2.2.1.1 of the ADA. 
67See Art 2.2.2 of the ADA. 
68See Art 2.1 of the ADA. 
69United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)8. 
70See Art 2.3 of the ADA. 
71See Art 2.3 of the ADA. 
72 Panel Report US – Stainless Steel WT/DS179/R, 6.93-6.94. 
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2.3.3 Fair comparison of normal value and export price  
 
A comparison is necessary in the determination of dumping.
73
 The ADA states that the 
comparison in price shall be made at the same level of trade, which is usually the price of the 
product at the time it leaves the factory and sales as nearly as possible at the same time.
74
 If a 
comparison is made at different levels of trade, prices may be affected. Accordingly, Art 2.4 
provides that costs incurred after that must be deducted by the investigating authority to the 
extent that they are included in the price. These adjustments in most anti-dumping cases are 
made depending on each case’s facts to make the comparison fairer.75   
 
For example, in the EU- Vietnam Bicycle case, factors were adjusted, such as: indirect tax, 
discounts, level of trade, transport (including handling costs) ocean freight, insurance costs, 
packing and credit costs: ‘For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal 
value and the export price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences 
affecting price comparability’.76 
 
2.3.4 How to calculate the dumping margin 
 
Due to the fact that dumping is about the price behaviour of individual exporters or producers, 
each exporter is normally (except in cases where, for example, the numbers are too high and 
sampling applies) entitled to an individual margin. The ADA normally requires either a 
comparison of the weighted average normal value to the weighted average of all comparable 
export prices, or a comparison of the normal value and the export price on a transaction-to-
transaction basis.
77
  But there is an exception provided to this rule according to Art 2.4.2 where a 
normal value is compared to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a 
pattern of export prices among different purchasers, regions or time periods to be considerably 
                                                             
73Li W Anti-dumping Law of the WTO/GATT and the EC: Gradual Evolution of Anti-dumping law in Global Econ 
Integration (2003) 40. 
74Denner W Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa-Review of Select Issues: Protectionism, 
Trade Remedies and Safeguards (2010) 1; See Art 2.4 of the ADA. 
75See Art 2.4 of the ADA. 
76Council of the European Union Reg no 1095/2005, 87. 
77See Art 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
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different and if an explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into 
account correctly by using weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction 
comparison.
78
 
 
The basic formula for calculating the dumping margin is:
79
  
 
                                                       
                           
       
 
The dumping margin is normally expressed as a percentage of the Adjusted Export Price (AEP). 
The following example illustrates the calculation:  
The Adjusted Normal Value (ANV) is United States Dollars (USD) 10.00 per kilogram and the 
AEP is USD 8.00 per kilogram. Therefore the dumping margin is (10.00 – 8.00) /8.00x 100 = 
25%. The product in this case has indeed been dumped.  
 
2.4 DETERMINATION OF INJURY AND CAUSAL LINK 
 
Determining the existence of dumping is just the first step. The next step is to make available to 
the government in an anti- dumping investigation, evidence showing that the domestic industry 
which produces a like product in the importing country is ‘materially injured’ or threatened as a 
result of the dumped imports.
80
  The determination of injury plays an important role in deciding 
whether anti-dumping measures can be imposed or not. That being said, the scope of the ‘like 
product’ produced by the ‘domestic industry’ as well as the state of the domestic industry must 
be examined. 
                                                             
78 See Art 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
79See Art 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
80 See Art 3.4 of the ADA, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-
dumping Measures (2003) 21. 
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2.4.1 ‘Like product in the importing country’ 
 
This is relevant in an anti-dumping investigation as there can be no injury unless an investigating 
authority determines whether the domestic industry produces a product alike to the dumped 
import.
81
 According to the ADA the two products are considered alike, where the dumped 
imported product and the domestic product are identical or where the latter has characteristics 
closely resembling those of the dumped product.
82
 The concept has been loosely interpreted in 
comparison to the four guiding criteria provided for by the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos
83
 to 
be employed in the determination of a ‘like product’. They include i) the properties, nature and 
quality of the products; ii)  the end-users of the products; iii) consumer tastes and habits with 
reference to the product; and iv) the tariff classification of the products.
84
  
 
This concept however has to be analysed on a case by case basis as was held by the Appellate 
Body in Japan-alcoholic beverages, stating that the idea of ‘likeness’ stirred the image of an 
accordion that ‘stretches and squeezes in different places’.85 In an anti-dumping enquiry this 
means that if the product manufactured and sold by the domestic industry in the importing 
country is neither identical to nor have characteristics of resemblance with the imported product 
then there is no domestic industry and no anti-dumping measures can be imposed. 
 
2.4.2 The ‘domestic industry’ 
 
Art 4 of the ADA defines ‘domestic industry’ to mean ‘the domestic producers as a whole of the 
like products or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major 
                                                             
81https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 2 February 2013). 
82See Art 2.6 of the ADA. 
83EC– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC- Asbestos) WT/DS135/AB/R. 
84 EC-Asbestos Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R, 101. 
85 Raju K WTO Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Legal Jurisprudence (2008) 41-42; Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report WT/DS8/AB/R. 
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proportion of the total domestic production of those products’.86 This principle has two 
exceptions which are excluded from the definition above: a) Where domestic producers are 
related to the exporters or importers under investigation. These producers are seen as a threat 
because they could benefit from dumping and thus may interfere with the injury analysis.
87
  b) 
Domestic producers who are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product.
88
 
 
In exceptional circumstances it happens that domestic producers in an isolated competitive 
market produce and sell all or almost their entire produce in that specific market and the demand 
is not to any significant degree supplied by producers elsewhere in the territory.
89
  This is known 
as a regional industry. Consideration of injury is given to these producers who comprise the 
regional industry if there is a concentration of dumped imports into the market served by this 
industry, causing injury to producers of all or almost all of the production within that market.
90
  
From the ADA it is clear that only some domestic producers become the ‘domestic industry’ and 
the determination of injury will be based on information relating to these producers.
91
 The 
protectionist angle of the domestic industry was portrayed in New Zealand-Finnish 
transformers
92
 where the complainant had divided the transformer market into four in order to 
find dumping and impose anti-dumping duties in an attempt to manipulate the definition of 
‘domestic industry’.93 It seemed that the purpose was to increase the chances of finding injury 
caused by dumped imports to the domestic industry; the panel found this not to be valid.
94
 
 
2.4.3 Injury 
 
Injury comprises present material injury, future injury (threat of material injury) and material 
retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry.
95
 None of these types of injury are 
                                                             
86 See Art 4.1 of the ADA. 
87 See Art 4.1(i) of the ADA; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: 
Anti-dumping Measures (2003) 26. 
88See Art 4.1(i) the ADA. 
89 See Art 4.1(ii) of the ADA. 
90WTO ‘Technical information on Anti-dumping’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm#domestic (accessed 21 March 2013). 
91https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf  (accessed 6 February 2013). 
92 GATT Panel Report, New Zealand-Imports of Electrical Transformers from Finland BISD 55. 
93 Raju K WTO Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Legal Jurisprudence (2008) 41-42. 
94 Raju K WTO Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Legal Jurisprudence (2008) 41-42. 
95 See footnote 9 of Art 3 of the ADA. 
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defined in the ADA and the investigating authorities are merely directed on what to examine in 
order to determine whether a domestic industry has suffered material injury or threat.
96
  
 
‘A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive 
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and 
the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the 
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products’.97 
 
Bolton
98
  criticises the failure of Art VI and the ADA to provide a definition of what constitutes 
material injury, and states that this omission limits the usefulness of that provision as a shield. He 
further says that the fact that since injury determinations can only be based on an ‘objective 
examination’ of ‘positive evidence’, the term gives much leeway to the examining agencies for 
determining how to interpret evidence, and does not require the importing country to disclose all 
the factors it considered in reaching its conclusion.
99
    
 
In the determination of injury, as defined by Art 3.1, with respect to the volume of the dumped 
imports, the investigating authority must consider whether there has been a ‘significant increase 
in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the 
importing Member’.100 For example, in the case of EU-Vietnam bicycle it was found on the basis 
of statistical information that the volume of bicycles imported from China and Vietnam to the 
European Union from January 2000 to 31 March 2004 increased from 435 373 units to 2 311 638 
units (an increase of 413%).
101
  
 
As far as the effect of the dumped imports on prices is concerned, an investigating authority must 
consider whether there has been ‘a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as 
                                                             
96Bown P ‘The WTO and Anti-dumping in Developing Countries’ (2007) Working paper of the World Bank No: 
4014, 8 footnote 11. 
97 Appellate Body Report, Thailand-H-Beams, WT/DS122/AB/R, 107 and 111;  Art 3.1 of the ADA. 
98Bolton M ‘Anti-dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties under the WTO through Heightened 
Scrutiny’ (2012) Berkeley Journal of International Law vol 29, 76. 
99Bolton M ‘Anti-dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties under the WTO through Heightened 
scrutiny’ (2012) Berkeley Journal of International Law vol 29, 76. 
100See Art 3.2 of the ADA. 
101Council of the European Union Reg no 1095/2005 118. 
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compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such 
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which 
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree’.102  When examining the impact of the 
dumped imports on the domestic industry, the ADA states that national authorities must evaluate 
all relevant industry data and economic factors, which include, actual and potential decline in 
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilisation of capacity; 
factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential 
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth and ability to raise 
capital or investments.
103
 It should be known well that the evaluation of the above 15 factors is 
mandatory, as held by the panel in EC Bed-Linen.
104
 
 
In the event that the material injury has not physically taken place, i.e it is merely a threat which 
will materialise unless an anti-dumping action is taken, the investigating authorities are obliged 
to determine the threat based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote 
possibility.
105
 Art 3.7 of the ADA offers special factors to be considered in making a threat 
determination, based on the fact that any investigation based on threat of material injury will 
necessarily be hypothetical.
106
 These special factors
107
 are: an increase in dumped imports; 
increase in capacity of the exporter; imports entering at prices that will have a significant 
depressing or suppressing effect; and inventories of the imported product being investigated. The 
four factors when considered jointly must lead to the conclusion that unless protective measures 
are taken, material injury will occur.
108
 It is of paramount importance to note that while 
examining the Art 3.7 factors in the determination of a threat of injury, the analysis cannot be 
solely on the factors listed above. The panel in Mexico-corn syrup
109
 stated that an analysis of 
the Art 3.4 factors was required in a case involving threat of injury. 
                                                             
102See Art 3.2 of the ADA. 
103United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)8; Art 3.4 of the ADA. 
104 Panel Report, EC-Bed Linen, 167. 
105See Art 3.7 of the ADA. 
106United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)26. 
107See Art 3.7 of the ADA. 
108See Art 3.7 of   the ADA. 
109 Panel Report  Mexico-Anti-dumping Investigations of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United 
States127. 
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2.4.4 The causal link between dumped imports and injury 
 
In an anti-dumping investigation, the causal link between dumped imports and injury must be 
established. It was earlier seen that this is realised by the evaluation of import volumes and 
prices and their impact on the domestic industry. This test is also important not only in 
determining material injury but also indicates whether injury was caused by dumped imports or 
other factors.
110
 The ADA requires that the demonstration of a causal relationship must be based 
on an examination of all the relevant evidence and any ‘known’ factors other than the dumped 
imports which are also injuring the domestic industry.
111
  It is not specified  how particular 
factors are ‘known’ nor is guidance given on how relevant evidence is to be evaluated, but the 
panel in Thailand-H-beams
112
 stipulated that ‘known’ factors  ‘…would include those causal 
factors that are clearly raised before the investigating authorities by interested parties in the 
course of an AD investigation’.113   
 
Art 3.5 provides a non-exhaustive list of other factors which could be relevant depending on the 
facts of each case, and also states that the injury as a result of such other known factors must not 
be attributed to the dumped imports. Although Art VI of  the GATT 1994, and the ADA, require 
a causal link to be established between the dumping of imports and the injury in the 
determination of dumping, Willig
114
  is of the opinion that it is possible to impose anti-dumping 
duties where the ‘link between dumping and injury’ is absent, by merely showing a threat of 
injury.  In other words, dumping is usually punished even though the shape and structure of the 
modern world economy make it particularly difficult to determine whether dumping is taking 
place and what its effects are.
115
 
                                                             
110United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003) 30-31. 
111See Art 3.5 of  the ADA. 
112 Panel Report Mexico-, Anti-dumping Investigations of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States 
126-7. 
113Panel Report Mexico-Anti-dumping Investigations of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United  States 
126-7. 
114 Willig R & Lawrence Z (ed) Economic Effects of Anti-dumping Policy: Brookings Trade Reform (1998) 2. 
115 Bolton M ‘Anti-dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties under the WTO through Heightened 
Scrutiny’(2012) Berkeley Journal of International Law vol 29 12; Willig R& Lawrence Z (ed) Economic Effects of 
Anti-dumping Policy: Brookings Trade Reform (1998) 2. 
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2.5   PROCEDURE FOR ENACTING NATIONAL ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES 
 
Anti-dumping investigations carried out in order to impose an anti-dumping measure (either in 
the form of an anti-dumping duty or price undertaking) conducted by WTO Members must, at a 
minimum, comply with the requirements contained in the ADA. WTO Members are free, and in 
some cases even encouraged by the ADA itself, to establish additional procedural requirements. 
Below are the procedural obligations that national authorities must comply with throughout the 
course of an anti-dumping investigation. 
 
2.5.1 Pre-initiation and application 
 
Except in special circumstances an investigation will be initiated at the request of the domestic 
industry by submitting an official complaint to the importing Member’s authorities stating that 
injurious dumping is taking place.
116
  This complaint is what is known as the ‘application’ in the 
ADA.
117
  In the application evidence must be presented with respect to dumping, injury and a 
causal link.
118
 Members are therefore obliged to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the 
evidence submitted in the application in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to justify the initiation of an investigation.
119
 In Guatemala- Cement II
120
 an application was 
struck down after it was determined that there was a lack of sufficient evidence of dumping and 
threat of injury to initiate an investigation and was thus inconsistent with Art 5.3 of the ADA.   
 
An application imposes another requirement called ‘standing’, which must be determined before 
initiation. ‘Standing’ means that an application is made by, or on behalf of, the domestic industry 
of the importing Member.
121
  In US – Seamless Stainless Steel122  the panel held that the failure 
by Members to properly determine standing before initiating an investigation is a serious error 
                                                             
116 See Art 5.6 of the ADA. 
117United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)33. 
118See Art 5.2 of the ADA. 
119See Art 5.3 of the ADA. 
120 Guatemala-Cement II Appellate Body WT/DS60/AB/R. 
121See Art 5.1 of the ADA. 
122 Panel Report ADP/47; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-
dumping Measures (2003)34. 
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which cannot be rectified retroactively since it is an essential procedural requirement. Art 5.4 
provides the tests to determine standing, which must be met to initiate an investigation: 
 
‘Supporting domestic producers account for more than 50% of total production of the like 
product by those expressing opinion (either support or oppose the application); 
And 
Supporting domestic producers account for more than 25% of total production’. 
 
It should be noted that prior to the initiation of the investigation the importing Member’s 
authorities must notify the government of the exporting Member and avoid publicising the 
application for the initiation of the investigation.
123
 The authorities will in many cases have to 
consult with various economic actors, before initiating a case, in order, for example, to determine 
if there is standing.    
 
2.5.2 Initiation 
 
Upon the investigating authority deciding to initiate an investigation, it is required to publish 
public notices of the commencement.
124
 Furthermore, the ADA sets out the content of the notice 
of initiation. This includes information on inter alia the  
 
‘name of the exporting country and the product involved, the basis on which dumping is 
alleged in the application, a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is 
based, the address to which representations by interested parties should be directed and 
the time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their views known’.125 
 
2.5.3 Transmission of the written application 
 
Foreign producers and their importers are more often than not reluctant to provide each other 
with individual confidential and sensitive business information. Because of this obvious reason, 
                                                             
123See Art 5.5 of the ADA. 
124See Art 12.1-12.1.1of the ADA. 
125See Art 12.1.1 of the ADA. 
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the ADA acknowledges the fact of confidentiality. However, it obliges the Members to provide 
the full non-confidential text of the written application which must be made available upon 
request, to other interested parties involved.
126
 According to the ADA, interested parties are the 
domestic and foreign producers, exporters and their importers, the government of the exporting 
country, and representative trade associations; other domestic or foreign parties may also be 
included as interested parties by the importing country.
127
 
 
2.5.4 Issuing of questionnaire and deadlines 
 
In an anti-dumping investigation the authorities must give notice of the information they require 
from exporters and foreign producers.
128
 The requests are in the form of questionnaires; 
exporters and foreign producers must be given a minimum of 30 days to respond to these 
questionnaires.
129
 This 30 day deadline is counted from the date of receipt of the 
questionnaire.
130
 Where the interested party does not provide the requested information as per the 
deadline, Art 6.8 provides that ‘… preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, 
may be made on the basis of the facts available’.  Just as interested parties have obligations, they 
also have due process rights which include the opportunity to present evidence in writing,
131
 the 
right of access to the evidence,
132
 the right to have a hearing and to meet opposing parties, and 
the right to disclosure.
133
  
 
Once the deadline has expired and replies to the questionnaires are obtained from the interested 
parties, they are analysed to decide whether the imported product is exported at a dumped price, 
whether the local industry has suffered material injury, and if there is a causal link between the 
injury and the dumped product.
134
  It is a requirement of the ADA for all investigating authorities 
carrying out an inquiry to be certain as to the accuracy of the information supplied by the 
                                                             
126See Art 6.5 of the ADA. 
127See Art 6.1.1 of the ADA. 
128See Art 6.1 of the ADA. 
129See Art 6.1.1 of the ADA; https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf 
(accessed 14 February 2013). 
130 See Footnote 15 of Art 6.1.1 of the ADA. 
131 See Art 6.1 of the ADA. 
132 See Art 6.1.2 of the ADA. 
 133 See Art 6.2 of the ADA. 
134See Art 6.10 of the ADA. 
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interested parties upon which they base their outcomes.
135
 Under normal circumstances, 
investigating officials discharge this obligation differently depending on the availability of 
resources. For instance, there is a very big difference between investigating authorities in 
developed and developing countries. In the former they carry out on the spot verifications on the 
premises of the exporters and domestic industries, while the developing countries, authentication 
is in the form of sampled documentation from exporters as they cannot afford the fare costs to 
travel abroad.
136
 
 
2.5.5 Provisional anti-dumping measures 
 
After the data has been analysed, a Member who wishes to impose provisional anti-dumping 
measures may do so after complying with the rules of the ADA. Provisional anti-dumping 
measures may only be applied if in an initiated investigation a preliminary affirmation has been 
made of dumping and injury, and the authorities judge the measures necessary to prevent injury 
being caused during the investigation.
137
 The measures may take the form of a provisional duty 
or preferably security (cash deposit or bond) equal to the amount of the preliminarily determined 
dumping margin.
138
 With regard to time limits: the said measures may not be applied sooner than 
60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation and may not last longer than nine 
months.
139
 The public must be notified of the provisional anti-dumping measures and the 
notification forwarded to the exporters and interested parties.
140
 The notice contains the 
established dumping margins with a full explanation of the method used to compare the normal 
and export value, and concerns relevant to the determination of injury.
141
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 135 https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 14 February 
2013). 
136 https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 14 February 
2013). 
137See Art 7.1 (i-iii) of the ADA. 
138See Art 7.2 of the ADA. 
139See Art 7.3 -7.4 of the ADA. 
140See Art 12.2.1of the ADA. 
141See Art 12.2.1of the ADA. 
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2.5.6 Final determination of anti-dumping measures 
 
Before a final determination is made the investigators are required by the ADA to inform all 
interested parties of the material facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision 
to apply definitive measures.
142
  Following the disclosure, interested parties must be given the 
opportunity to submit comments in writing on the findings of the preliminary determination and 
request hearings where they address issues on which they are in disagreement with the 
investigating authority's findings and conclusions of law or fact.
143
 
 
The comments of the interested parties are analysed by the investigating authority and thereafter 
the adoption and publication of the notice imposing the anti-dumping measures, either in the 
form of price undertakings or anti-dumping duties, takes place. 
 
 Price undertakings 
 
In an anti-dumping investigation, proceedings may be suspended or terminated without the 
imposition of provisional measures or anti-dumping duties in cases where exporters and the 
authorities of importing Members enter into an undertaking to revise prices or cease exports 
at dumped prices. The increase in price agreed upon must not be higher than necessary to 
eliminate the dumping margin.
144
   
 
While price undertakings are often the preferred solution of exporters, the authorities have 
the discretion to accept or reject the undertakings offered.
145
 Although developing countries 
receive little special and differential treatment under the ADA, a panel held that acceptance 
of the price undertaking may qualify as a constructive remedy.
146
 If the investigating 
authorities accept the offer, the anti-dumping duties will not be levied as long as the 
                                                             
142 https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 15 February 
2013). 
143See Art 6.9 of the ADA. 
144See Art 8.1of the ADA. 
145United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)40. 
146Panel Report in EC-Bed Linen 238. 
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undertaking stays in effect. Should there be a breach, the undertaking falls away and anti-
dumping duties may apply immediately.
147
 
 
 Anti-dumping duties 
Anti-dumping duties can only be imposed where all the requirements for imposition have 
been met. The decision on whether to impose anti-dumping duties even where all the 
requirements have been met rests on the Members.
148
 Some WTO Members have included a 
‘public interest clause’ in their national legislation so that they are able to refrain from 
imposing duties even where dumping which is causing injury is found.
149
 For example, 
imposition may fail to be applied if it would be disadvantageous to users of the product. An 
anti-dumping imposed duty must be collected in a non-biased manner and must not exceed 
the dumping margin.
150
 If there is any excess duty paid, the ADA has rules on reimbursement 
of the importing Members. 
 
May an anti-dumping investigator impose a measure which is at a level lower than the 
dumping margin? Indeed, Art 9.1 encourages, but does not require, Members to apply the 
‘lesser duty rule’, under which a duty lower than the dumping margin may be applied if it is 
sufficient to remove the injury to the domestic industry. 
 
2.5.7 Adoption and publication of the notice  
 
Details about the definitive imposed measures must be published in the Official Gazette or in a 
separate report.
151
  In addition, the authorities of the Members whose products are subject to the 
final determination and the interested parties must be notified.
152
  The definitive measure (price 
undertaking or anti-dumping duties) must expire within five years from its imposition or ‘from 
                                                             
147See Art 8.6 of the ADA. 
148See Art 9.1of the ADA. 
149United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)40. 
150See Art 9.2-9.3 of the ADA. 
151https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 15 February 
2013). 
152https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 15 February 
2013). 
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the date of the most recent change of circumstances review, if this review has covered both 
dumping and injury
’.153
  The only exception to this five year limit is where an investigating 
authority carrying out a review investigation prior to the expiration of the measure, finds that the 
expiry of the measure would lead to either recurrence or continuation of dumping and injury 
(sunset review).
154
 
 
2.6 REVIEWS 
 
There are four types of reviews provided for by the ADA: sunset or expiry review, new shipper 
review, change of circumstances review, and judicial review.   
 
2.6.1 Sunset or expiry review 
 
According to Art 11 of the ADA, the general principle is that anti-dumping measures (duties and 
price undertakings) must expire within five years from their imposition, unless the domestic 
industry asks for a review and substantiates it prior to the expiry of the measure, and the 
investigating authorities establish that the expiry of the duty would likely lead to a continuation 
or recurrence of dumping and injury. A proper analysis is required for the extension of the anti-
dumping measure beyond five years, i.e, the mere possibility of injury and dumping will be 
considered insufficient. If the authorities find that the anti-dumping duty is not warranted, the 
measure will automatically terminate.
155
 There are certain Members of the WTO that have 
applied anti-dumping measures for a long time through the use of this review; for example the 
USA and Canada. The USA applied measures for more than 20 years on polychloroprene rubber 
from Japan, and Canada for more than 30 years on waterproof rubber footwear from the People’s 
Republic of China.
156
 
                                                             
153See Art 11.3 of the ADA. 
154See footnote 22 of Art 11.3 of the ADA. 
155 See Art 11.2 of the ADA. 
156 https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 15 February 
2013). 
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2.6.2 New shipper review 
 
A producer who is a newcomer, i.e, he exported products after the imposition of the anti-
dumping measures, may request the importing Member’s authorities to calculate a dumping 
margin specific to him, since if this is not done, he will be subject to the ‘other’ rate imposed in 
the original investigation.
157
  Under the EU system, exporters or foreign producers who enter the 
market after the imposition of the anti-dumping duties are the most affected, as they are expected 
to pay the highest anti-dumping duties imposed. The highest duty is the general rate which 
applies to any exporter without an individual rate of duty.
158
 According to Piontek, this practice 
portrays a very over-protective edge of the EU anti-dumping system. The situation is worsened 
by the EU as it does not accept undertakings from the exporters.
159
   
 
Art 9.5 of the ADA provides that new exporters are entitled to individual margins of dumping on 
condition that they show that they have no relations with any exporters in their home countries 
subject to anti-dumping duties on the product. During this review no anti-dumping duty shall be 
levied on these producers. However, the importing Member may withhold appraisement and/or 
request assurances that should the review result in a determination of dumping, duties can be 
levied retroactively to the initiation date of the review. 
160
 
 
 
2.6.3 Change of circumstances review 
 
After the imposition of anti-dumping measures, circumstances that led to the imposition of the 
original measures may change. For example, if the normal value decreases, the dumping margin 
                                                             
157 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003)43; See Art 9.5 of the ADA. 
158 Krishna R ‘Anti-dumping in Law and Practice’ Policy Research Working Paper available at 
http://books.google.com/books/.../Antidumping_in_Law_and_Practice.htm  (accessed 16 February 2013). 
159 Krishna R ‘Anti-dumping in Law and Practice’ Policy Research Working Paper available at 
http://books.google.com/books/.../Antidumping_in_Law_and_Practice.htm  (accessed 16 February 2013). 
160 See Art 9.5 of the ADA. 
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will reduce, eventually causing the anti-dumping measure to change.
161
  If such a situation takes 
place, Members are allowed by the ADA to request the authorities to examine if the continued 
imposition of the duty is essential to offset dumping, whether there is a likelihood of injury 
recurring if the duty was to be removed or varied.
162
  If after review it is determined that 
dumping is not present any more, the measure should be repealed by the authorities.
163
 
 
2.6.4 Judicial review 
 
Members who adopt anti-dumping legislation are required by Art 13 to maintain judicial, arbitral 
or administrative tribunals or other procedures, for the purpose of reviewing administrative 
actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determinations. The tribunals and 
procedures must be independent of the investigating authorities.
164
 Any interested party may 
request judicial review of certain administrative actions where they feel that the provisions of 
ADA were not respected. The tribunals conducting judicial review apply their own domestic 
anti-dumping laws in resolving the disputes, which should be as close as possible to the WTO’s 
provisions, thereby acting as an ancillary to the WTO’s dispute system.165 On the other hand, the 
domestic judicial review differs from the WTO dispute system in that private bodies can use the 
former, whereas the latter is only for inter-government disputes. Furthermore, the number of 
judicial reviews brought to the local tribunals with respect to trade remedies is higher than that of 
the WTO. This could mean that if the local judicial system is a reliable one, then the WTO also 
benefits.
166
 
 
Between 1995 and 2011, of all disputes initiated in the WTO, almost 40 % dealt with trade 
remedies, the majority being anti-dumping.
167
  Review in the WTO is subject to the provisions of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding which applies to consultations and settlement of disputes. 
Members who are of the opinion that their rights are being impaired by another importing 
                                                             
161 https://etraining.wto.org/admin/files/Course_246/CourseContents/TR-R2-E-Print.pdf (accessed 15 February 
2013). 
162 See Art 11.2 of the ADA. 
163 See Art 11.2 of the ADA. 
164See Art 13 of the ADA. 
165 Yilmaz M Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies: Experiences of the Most Active WTO Members (2013)5. 
166 Yilmaz M Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies: Experiences of the Most Active WTO Members (2013)7. 
167Yilmaz M Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies: Experiences of the Most Active WTO Members (2013) 6. 
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Member may request in writing for consultations with the other Member.
168
  If no solution has 
been achieved and there is final action by the administering authorities to levy anti-dumping 
measures, the matter may be taken to the Dispute Settlement Body.
169
 Should the complaining 
Member succeed in the dispute settlement process, the Member who is not complying will have 
to bring the measure in harmony with the WTO obligations or negotiate compensation with the 
aggrieved Member. A failure by the non-compliant Member will lead to the suspension of an 
equivalent level of concessions granted to it by the aggrieved Member.
170
 
 
It is said that dispute settlement cases dealing with anti-dumping take very long and are very 
expensive. However, on the contrary, WTO dispute settlement matters proceed much faster than 
reviews conducted by national courts. No wonder this unique body with compulsory jurisdiction 
has been identified to be ‘the most successful system for international dispute settlement in the 
history of the world.’171  It should be noted that the ADA has very detailed provisions on 
consultations and the standards of review applicable to panels examining claims under it.
172
 
 
2.7 NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
 
Last but not least, there are notification obligations set by the ADA with respect to 
representatives from each of the members, also known as the ‘committee’ that must meet not less 
than twice a year.
173
 Members must ensure that their domestic anti-dumping laws are in line with 
the ADA.
174
 Hence, the committee must be notified of the existing domestic anti-dumping laws 
and regulations, or any changes to previously notified ones.
175
 In addition, Members must report 
all preliminary or final actions taken with respect to anti-dumping measures. Such reports are 
open for inspection in the secretariat by other Members.
176
 
                                                             
168See Art 17.3 of the ADA. 
169See Art 17.4 of the ADA. 
170Yilmaz M Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies: Experiences of the Most Active WTO Members (2013) 3. 
171 Bacchus J ‘Open Doors for Open Trade: Shining Light on WTO Dispute Settlement’ available at 
www.worledtradelaw.net/articles/baccusopendoors.pdf  (accessed 4 February 2013). 
172See Art 17 of the ADA. 
173See Art 16.1 of the ADA. 
174 See Art 18.4 of the ADA. 
175 See Art 18.5 of the ADA. 
176 See Art 16.4 of the ADA. 
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The ADA requires the submission of semi-annual reports of any anti-dumping action taken in the 
previous six months.
177
 As a final point, the committee must be notified of the authorities 
competent to initiate and conduct anti-dumping investigations as well as of the domestic 
procedures governing those investigations.
178
 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
In this Chapter the substantive and procedural requirements of the WTO dealing specifically 
with dumping (Art VI and the ADA) have been discussed to provide clarity of the detailed rules 
how Members can ensure conformity of their anti-dumping laws with the provisions of the ADA. 
Although Members are free to establish additional procedural requirements, they should do so 
with caution. This is so because failure to respect the provisions of the ADA will result in either 
a judicial review of the administrative action or the bringing of a case to the WTO. If the 
importing Member is found to have violated a certain provision of the ADA, then the whole 
measure may fail. It is therefore essential that those countries which either intend to use or are 
new in the use of this instrument that investigations comply with the strict principles of the 
ADA. 
  
                                                             
177See Art 16.4 of the ADA. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE NEED FOR ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION IN KENYA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Kenya is among the founding members of the WTO with its accession thereto being completed 
by December 1994. It is a signatory to all the WTO agreements including Art VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).
179
  Through 
the WTO it has participated in the multilateral trading system with the objective of achieving 
effective market access, and supports the WTO’s role in strengthening the trading system and 
promoting a rules based, freer and predictable trading environment through the removal of trade 
barriers. Kenya has shown commitment to the WTO by tarrifying its quantitative trade 
restrictions, fixed its tariffs against further increases, and reduced them over time. All duties and 
charges applied have also been fixed and the schedule of commitments on the various products 
provided.
180
 However, as a result of lowering the fixed tariffs and consequently experiencing an 
increased exposure to market instability there have been concerns over inadequate domestic 
market protection particularly for cereals and sugar which have been negatively affected by the 
increase of imports. 
 
Following the analysis of the international standards for the use of anti-dumping in the previous 
chapter, it was noted that in certain circumstances countries are free to use the ADA in order to 
offer protection to import competing industries. Each Member implements their national anti-
dumping policies according to the general guidelines specified in the GATT and ADA. Chapter 
three seeks to prove that although this right is available to all Members, Kenya should be advised 
to establish and evaluate sufficient reasons as to why it is in need of the instrument. Kenya must 
be aware of the costs of adopting such a policy and care must be exercised in its decision to have 
an anti-dumping instrument. Furthermore, anti-dumping as a trade policy has significant impacts 
                                                             
179 Odhiambo W, Kamau P &McCormick D ‘Kenya’s Participation in the WTO: Lessons Learned’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case20_e.htm  (accessed 22 February 2013). 
180 Nyangito H Agricultural Trade Reforms in Kenya under the World Trade Organization Framework (2003) 11. 
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beyond the duties and measures observed which include potential strategic actions and distortion 
of market outcomes.
181
  
 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to explain the basis for anti-dumping laws in Kenya; the 
economic (looking at the major sectors negatively affected by dumping) and non-economic 
grounds, the current domestic anti-dumping law of Kenya and its analysis, and lastly the laws of 
the East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA).  
 
3.2 ECONOMIC RATIONALE: INTERNATIONAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
Kenya’s agricultural sector is dominated by primary production of commodities categorised as 
export crops (coffee, tea, and horticulture), basic food crops (maize, wheat and rice), and 
industrial crops (sugar, pyrethrum, cotton).
182
  It is a very important sector. First, to the 
population, as it is their largest employer and 80 per cent thereof depend on it for their 
livelihood.
183
  Secondly, to the economy, as it contributed 24.2 per cent to the Gross Domestic 
Product in 2012.
184
 In 2010 it grew significantly with real growth of 6.5 per cent mainly as a 
result of the government’s intervention through increase of exports and provision of farm 
inputs.
185
  That being said, all has not been well and the sector has experienced a myriad of 
challenges. For example, some sub-sectors have become a dumping ground for over-produced, 
subsidised agriculture from the developed countries, and there has been poor legislative and 
institutional governance to deal with the imminent threat that affects this sector, among others.
186
  
 
                                                             
181 Prusa T & Blonigen B ‘Anti-dumping’ Working Paper 8398 available at http://m.nber.org//papers/w8398 
(accessed 4 February 2013). 
182 Nyangito H Agricultural Trade Reforms in Kenya under the World Trade Organization Framework (2003) 11. 
183 FAO ‘Agriculture, Trade and Food Security Issues and Options in the WTO Negotiations from the Perspective of 
Developing Countries: Kenya’ available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8731e/x8731e09.htm (accessed 1 march 
2013). 
184 WTO Trade Policy Review –Kenya, 17 October 2012 WT/TPR/G/27 available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g271_e.doc (accessed 2 March 2013). 
185 WTO Trade Policy Review –Kenya, 17 October 2012 WT/TPR/G/27 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g271_e.doc (accessed 2 March 2013). 
186 Odhiambo W& Otieno G ‘Trade Policy Reforms and Poverty in Kenya: Processes and Outcomes’ available at 
www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/backgrounder-Kenya.pdf (accessed 8 April 2013). 
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Dumping, which is referred to as selling a product at a lower price in an export market than in 
the home market, leads to domestic producers in an importing country market being unable to 
offer such low prices and shutting down businesses, while the exporter maintains a higher price 
in its home market, thereby compensating for lower export prices.
187
 This is international price 
discrimination which has generally caused devastating effects and ultimately calls for a 
solution.
188
  The agricultural sub- sectors discussed below are highlighted because they are major 
domestic and export crops which are important to the local producers and yet they are the most 
affected by trade related problems caused by intermittent dumping. Therefore, anti-dumping 
laws are necessary to protect these sub- sectors.  
 
3.2.1 The wheat sub-sector 
 
Wheat is the second most important cereal grain in Kenya, being self-sufficient in the hard 
variety and net importing the soft kind.
189
  The wheat industry contributes 30 per cent of the 
cereal Gross Domestic Product and supports about 11.3 per cent of the national population.
190
   
Over the years this commodity has become economically unsustainable because of the effects of 
indirect dumping of cheap wheat on the market. In 1992 and 1993, the EU sold wheat in Kenya 
for 39 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively, cheaper than the price paid to EU farmers. This led 
to an increase in importation while the Kenyan local price collapsed due to over-supply and 
weakening of local production.
191
  Since 2002, Kenya has been importing cheap wheat flour, 
which has been manufactured from the EU and the USA wheat, from Egypt and Mauritius. 
Egypt, which is one of the top destinations for EU wheat and the second largest market for the 
USA wheat exports,
192
  imports the wheat at give- away prices, mills it and re-exports the flour 
                                                             
187 Wolfgang M, Khan N & Scharf T  EC and WTO Anti-Dumping Law (2009) 5-6. 
188 Wolfgang M, Khan N &Scharf T EC and WTO Anti-Dumping Law (2009) 5-6. 
189 All about Kenya ‘Wheat in Kenya’ available at http://softkenya.com/farming/wheat-in-kenya/ (accessed 7 march 
2013). 
190Gitau R & Mburu S ‘The Efficiency and Competitiveness of Wheat Production in Kenya’ available at 
www.tegemeo.org/.../The-Efficiency-and-Competitiveness-of-Wheat- (accessed 7 march 2013). 
191Mittal A ‘Industrial Agriculture: Land Loss, Poverty and Hunger’ (2001) International Forum on Globalization 2-
4. 
192Voluntary Report Approved by Pomeroy T ‘Egypt Grain and Feed Egypt’s Wheat Imports MY 2000/2001’ 
available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200106/105680869.pdf (accessed 7 March 2013). 
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to Kenya.
193
  This is price arbitrage, through the re-exportation of the dumped products which in 
terms of import competition will definitely affect the importers’ domestic industry negatively.194  
 
There is no doubt that in this case dumping is occurring because the export price into the Kenyan 
market is less than the cost of production of the product in Egypt, the EU and the USA, plus a 
reasonable addition for selling, general administration costs and profit.
195
 This is also known as 
the constructed normal value of the product which is one of the options to determine the normal 
value of a product in order to establish dumping. By selling the products abroad at prices below 
cost, Egyptian companies are able to force domestic producers out of the market by establishing 
monopolies which permit them to charge inflated prices without fear of competition. 
 
Material injury caused by the influx of cheap wheat and flour was indeed suffered by Kenyan 
wheat farmers. In an interview with Action Aid, an international development organisation, 
Mercy Karanja of the Kenya National Farmers Union said that due to the huge surplus on the 
market, farmers sold their wheat at very low prices while the millers refused to purchase local 
wheat since they could not compete with the cheap imported flour.
196
  Furthermore, farmers who 
faced ruin as the wheat prices sank by more than 30 per cent shifted to other activities, like maize 
and dairy farming, since they could not compete.
197
  Obviously, with the low production the 
reliance on imports increased, causing serious implications for the country’s balance of trade and 
food security. 
 
The then Minister of Trade, the Honourable Mukhisa Kituyi, told the Kenyan farmers that the 
government would address their concerns by invoking anti-dumping rules against Egypt, whose 
products were reportedly 600 per cent cheaper than their local equivalents.
198
  Dumping in such a 
                                                             
193 Soi J ‘Farmers: Restore Duty on Egyptian Wheat Flour’ The Nation 8 February 2000. 
194 Matsushita M &Schoenbaum J The World Trade Organization – Law, Practice, and Policy (2006) 399-405. 
195See Art 2.2 of the ADA; Ritchie M, Wisniewski S & Murphy S Dumping as a Structural Feature of US 
Agriculture: Can the WTO Rules Solve the Problem? (2006)14. 
196 Interview with Action Aid, July 2002 available at   http://thebritishgeographer.weebly.com/managing-
sustainable-food-supply.html (accessed 2 March 2013). 
197 Interview with Action Aid, July 2002 available at http://thebritishgeographer.weebly.com/managing-sustainable-
food-supply.html (accessed 2 March 2013). 
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case via a third country could be difficult to prove especially in cases where there is processing 
before trans-shipment and where trade data often does not reveal an export’s final destination.199   
 
The Kenyan government, however, imposed tariffs on Egyptian wheat flour imports in terms of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) framework to which they both 
adhere.
200
  Since then very little has been done probably in fear of another retaliatory action from 
Egypt, as was seen in 2000 and 2001. Then Kenya placed duties on Egypt’s rice and paper sacks, 
due to suspicions that they were re-exported rather than Egyptian made. What followed was a 
reprisal in the form of an import duty of 33 per cent on Kenyan tea. 
201
 The question of the nature 
and extent of the measures to be put in place to deal with dumping of cheap wheat from the EU 
and Egypt was raised in the Kenyan Parliament in July 2010.
202
  Nothing came of the debate but 
contradictory statements. It is quite clear from the above instances that it is about time that 
Kenya protects its local industries by designing domestic legislation that seeks to effectively 
respond to the practice of dumping. 
 
3.2.2 The sugar sub-sector 
 
Sugarcane farming, which takes place in the western and coastal parts of Kenya, is depended 
upon by approximately five million Kenyans, either directly or indirectly.
203
 The factories 
producing sugar are either completely or partially government owned with only one being 
entirely privatised.
204
   Sugar production was stable between 1963 and 1986, but it has since 
declined as domestic market share has shrunk after the post-liberalisation period in the face of 
                                                             
199 Action aid ‘Farm Gate Report: The Developmental Impact of Agricultural Subsidies’ available at 
www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/farmgate_report.pdf  (accessed 27 February 2013). 
200Munaita P ‘Kenya to Invoke Anti-dumping Rule against Egypt’ available at 
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cheap international imports.
205
  When the government begun liberalising trade in the mid 1990s 
they did so without adequate care, exposing local producers to more competitive produced 
imports when it was ill-prepared to deal with the consequences which included an unchecked 
influx of dumped imported sugar into the local market.
206
  That fact among others has caused the 
industry to run at a loss almost to the point of collapsing.  
 
In 2003, the Kenya Sugar Cane Grower Association lobbied for a ban on the importation of 
sugar; unfortunately the government could not close its borders due to its commitments in the 
WTO agreements and mainly for fear of retribution by Egypt.
207
  Although there could be no 
banning of imports, COMESA granted Kenya a year extension to levy duties on sugar to offset 
the massive inflow of cheap imports from other Members of the bloc.
208
 Currently, the total 
demand for sugar exceeds total production, and imports are the solution to cure the huge 
consumption deficit. 
209
  However, as Kenya imports this strategic commodity it seems that it 
does not come without a trade war as dumping practices have rapidly increased on the African 
markets. For example, in August 2012, there was a row between Kenya and Uganda over alleged 
dumping of cheap sugar by the latter into the Kenyan market which prompted the Kenya 
Revenue Authority (KRA) to introduce cash bonds as a provisional measure to stop dumping of 
sugar imports transiting through the port of Mombasa to Uganda.
210
  The two countries had an 
agreement the previous year that Uganda would import sugar through the Kenyan port tax-free 
for six months on condition that the sugar would only be consumed there.
211
  If it was re-
exported back to Kenya a levy of 100 per cent would be charged by the Kenyan Revenue 
Authority.
212
  Within a period of two months the Revenue Authority’s statistics showed that 
sugar imports to Uganda had not only increased to 50 million kilograms, exceeding the agreed 
quota for the six months by 40 million kilograms, but  that in addition the Ugandan millers were 
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stocking up cheap sugar and re- exporting it to Kenya and other East African countries with 
lower costs of production being declared (at $700 per tonne) as opposed to the industrial  average 
levels in these countries (at $850 per tonne).
213
  
 
The effects of dumping sugar have simultaneously been felt by the farmers and the sugar 
companies over the years. The sugar companies, that find it very difficult to sell their stock, are 
discouraged from fetching cane from the farmers who in turn simply leave their sugarcane farms 
idle and languish in poverty.
214
  With this kind of disillusionment the supply drops as nobody is 
interested in producing a crop that bears no returns. 
 
Although Kenya has taken a protectionists stand
215
  on the international trade of sugar by using 
the COMESA safeguards, the authorities should devise their own workable precedent that will 
assist in solving dumping disputes in the present and the future, since the safeguard provision 
which Kenya has relied on for over a decade will be expiring in March 2014 with a very slim 
chance of being renewed again. It is obvious from the above cases that the developed countries 
are neither the only ones who are in need of the anti-dumping rules nor the only ones exporting 
products at a low price, below the cost of production, onto the African markets. African nations 
are also dumping in each other’s countries prompting a need for protection of our markets 
against all unfair competition by the introduction and implementation of legislation. Clear 
policies will be of great assistance to Kenya as it seeks to liberalise further in order to achieve 
economic growth and development in its economy. 
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3.2.3 The textile sub-sector 
 
Since 1970 the textile sub-sector has been a key part of the manufacturing sector in Kenya.
216
  
The industry at that time employed more than 200,000 small-scale farmers, which constituted a 
third of its labour force, and enjoyed government protection by imposing 100 percent duty on 
imported goods, the largest contributor to its success.
217
   
 
The triumph was shortlived because in the 1980s its challenges began as a result of the 
government's removal of its support, leading to a massive increase in the dumping of cheap 
imported used clothes commonly known as ‘mitumba’ from Europe and the USA .218  Since then 
the thriving sector significantly stopped growing as it could not compete any longer. Recently 
cheap foreign brands have entered the market from South East Asia showing an increase of 
imported clothing from the previous year.
219
  The flooding of the market with cheap imports 
caused the demand and purchasing power for local clothing to decrease. An interesting effect of 
dumping on the producers is that the local industries have begun imitating the foreign brands, 
giving up on maintaining originality perhaps so that they can remain in business.
220
 
 
According to current reports the industry now only employs less than 20,000 workers.
221
  As of 
March 2012, the government spent a large amount of money to revive the textile industry. The 
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Kenya Revenue Authority even went ahead to increase the import duty in order to cut down on 
the influx of imports,
222
  but what Kenya really needs is to re-structure its anti-dumping policy to 
deal with this practice because the duties are applied on a case by case basis, which is not a 
reliable method. 
 
3.3 NON-ECONOMIC RATIONALE 
 
To have a government policy like the anti-dumping law is not only motivated by economic 
concerns, social wellbeing is also an important factor.
223
  The cost that the members of the 
community have to pay when domestic production is distorted by low priced imports is normally 
quite high, and more often than not the results are an impairment of their welfare as social 
beings.
224
   
Those affected include producers, who are left defenceless and cannot produce anymore, and 
workers, who lose their jobs once industries downsize their operations, close or relocate. 
Eventually workers are not in a position to purchase goods and services because they lack 
incomes. Consumers are also not left out, to the extent that in the long run they are affected. How 
is this possible? In the short run, dumping is seen to be beneficial for the consumer as she is able 
to buy the same product at a cheaper imported price in comparison to the local price.
225
  
However, in the long run, what happens when there is no constant long-term supply of the 
dumped product or the exporter establishes a monopoly and prices are hiked with the supply 
decreasing?
226
   The consumers suffer a loss eventually.  
 
In Kenya most of the communities depend on wheat and sugar as their sources of livelihood, 
which means that it is necessary to protect the domestic industry from unfair competition and in 
turn prevent a drastic alteration of the communities’ nature.227  An anti-dumping enquiry under 
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the WTO requires proof of material threat/injury/retardation caused by dumping to the domestic 
industry.
228
  When industries suffer, people at large also suffer. It is evident from the cases of 
trade in wheat flour, sugar and textiles that there are detrimental impacts on production and 
markets.
229
  Among others, farmers face great difficulty in selling their produce on the local 
market because of the volumes of cheap imports forcing them to cut their produce by half.
230
  
The community in turn suffers too when its food supplies become vulnerable to price increases 
which its members cannot afford.
231
 
 
From the above it seems that the two rationales are related. If the economy is hurt, then the 
people are also affected. Therefore, for fairness and the wellbeing of the Kenyan people, it is 
important for the government when designing an anti-dumping framework to do so bearing in 
mind the community and how it is affected by the unfair practices. This should also initiate 
legislation not because of economic concerns. 
 
3.4 CURRENT ANTI-DUMPING REGULATION IN KENYA 
 
The Customs and Excise Department of the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) facilitates trade, 
collects trade statistics, deals with dumping complains, and offers protection against the entry or 
exit of illicit goods.
232
  It works in conjunction with other ministries, including Agriculture, 
Trade and Industry, and Finance, in trade policy formulation and implementation. The Customs 
and Excise Department is headed by a Commissioner who ensures the administration of the 
Customs and Excise Act.
233
  The Customs and Excise Act Cap 472 provides rules on the 
management, control, accountability and collection of revenue. With respect to dumping the 
Customs and Excise Act’s s125 and 126 are the only provisions on dumping in Kenya.234  
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Apart from what these two provisions provide, there are no further details stipulated with regard 
to dumping. According to s126 (1), imports are considered to have been dumped in Kenya if the 
export price of the goods is less than the comparable price in the ordinary course of trade in the 
exporting country, and as a consequence cause material injury or retardation of  the local 
industry.  
 
Different from other Acts, the ‘export price’ is given a different name, ‘price payable’, which 
means ‘payment made or to be made by a buyer to or for the benefit of a seller of imported goods 
which are subject to custom valuation’.235   With respect to the ‘normal value’, it is not defined 
per se, although from the definition of ‘dumping’ according to the Customs and Excise Act, it is 
the price in the exporter’s home country.  Assume that the dumped product was not sold in the 
exporter’s home country, or it was not sold in the ordinary course of trade: how then does one 
determine the export price and how will a successful comparison be made? And does it mean 
that the export price stated by the foreign producer will always be relied on since Kenya has no 
alternatives to establish this price?  For the purposes of anti-dumping investigations in Kenya, it 
is clear that the legislation does not provide any of the other methods of establishing the ‘export 
price’ and the ‘normal value’ made available by the WTO’s ADA.  
 
The comparison between the export price and the normal value must be ‘fair’. To ensure this, 
differences affecting the comparison between the two prices, should be adjusted. Those provided 
for in the Customs and Excise Act relate to packing charges, transport, and any levy, duty or 
tax.
236
  In situations where there are other differences affecting price comparability, such as, 
where the comparison requires currency conversion,
237
  and differences in the terms and 
conditions of sale, how will a ‘fair’ comparison be achieved when  there are no established rules 
on how to do this? In addition to proving dumping, the Customs and Excise Act requires two 
other criteria to be met before imposing definitive anti-dumping measures, that is, material injury 
and causation.
238
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The determination of material injury according to the ADA shall be based on positive evidence, 
an objective examination, and verifiable evidence
239
 which must be provided in writing or orally, 
if it will subsequently be reproduced in writing.
240
  In Argentina-Ceramic tiles, the investigating 
officers were allowed to make this determination on the basis of ‘facts available’ on condition 
that that requirement was clearly and specifically stated by the investigating authorities.
241
  
 
According to the Customs and Excise Act, injury is merely defined as ‘material injury, threat of 
material injury or material retardation.’242  There is no guideline on how to establish or what 
constitutes material injury, giving the impression that the officer in charge has the leeway to 
determine what amounts to injury. Seeing that there are no rules on this issue, using the ‘facts 
available’ will also not be possible because that too was neither clearly nor specifically declared.   
 
The Customs and Excise Act also fails to show how to establish the last requirement- causation, 
despite it being an essential requirement. Simply because a domestic industry claims to have 
complied with the legal criteria to establish dumping, it is not enough to impose anti-dumping 
duties. Procedures must be followed to confirm the allegations. Normally anti-dumping disputes 
begin when a domestic industry gathers support, also known as ‘standing’, to request a dumping 
investigation.
243
   
 
In Kenya, anti-dumping actions are dealt with at a national level by the Permanent Secretary at 
the Ministry of Finance. Since the Customs and Excise Act does not define ‘standing’, any 
industry affected by dumping is required to contact the Minister with sufficient evidence of the 
nature and source of the dumped products and the material injury suffered by the local industry 
as a result of dumping.
244
  An ad hoc advisory committee comprised of ten people and 
established by the Minister in the Government Gazette carries out investigations on the supposed 
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practices and reports the findings to the Minister.
245
 The Minister who lays down the procedure 
to be followed in the performance of the investigation may impose the necessary provisional 
measures after 60 days of the investigation commencing to protect any industry that is threatened 
by dumping in Kenya.
246
  When he is satisfied with the findings of the committee that the 
products were dumped he may impose an anti-dumping duty (which shall not exceed the 
dumping margin) in addition to any other duty for the time being chargeable on the respective 
goods.
247
 The given order shall among others specify the import’s country of origin, the goods 
charged with the duty, and the organisation or person associated with the production of the 
goods.
248
 A notice of the imposed duty is then issued in the Government Gazette by the 
Attorney-General’s chambers.249 
 
The ADA which allows members to utilise national laws, regulations and procedures requires a 
notification to the WTO and consistency of the domestic laws with the ADA.
250
 Although the 
Customs and Excise Act provides the legal basis for Kenya to take anti-dumping measures and it 
has notified the WTO of its domestic laws and procedures,
251
 it has not yet amended its 
legislation to conform to the WTO rules since 2000 as stated in the WTO Trade Policy Review 
of that year.
252
 
 
3.4.1 An analysis of the Customs and Excise Act  
 
An examination of the provisions on anti-dumping under the Customs and Excise Act shows that 
although it sets out some important elements with respect to anti-dumping, very little detail is 
either provided or clearly stated in comparison to the ADA, COMESA and East African 
Community (EAC) provisions examined below. The Kenyan legislation is outdated, non-
consolidated and insufficient to adequately deal with the issues arising from reducing tariffs and 
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the results of liberalising trade which has increased the need for anti-dumping measures.
253
  
Moreover, it does not comply with the WTO’s substantive and procedural requirements. 
Meanwhile it takes advantage of the exceptions allowed to developing countries with respect to 
constructive remedies under Art 15 of the ADA. Harmonisation with EAC and COMESA laws is 
also absent. The challenges that the sub-sectors described in 3.2.1-3.2.3 experienced and 
continue to experience speak for themselves as to the need for an adequate legal and institutional 
framework in Kenya.  
 
In terms of detail, the Customs and Excise Act omits key elements: it does not clearly specify 
how to determine normal values and the export price, or how to alternatively achieve these prices 
through different methods; there is also no definition of or a clear guideline to establish the 
domestic industry, material injury, and causation. Policy questions, such as, public interest and 
lesser duty clauses, have been left out as well. As was seen in the previous chapter, anti-dumping 
investigations require detailed analyses, capable and responsible authorities, as well as clear 
procedures to be followed by the investigating officers.  
 
The Customs and Excise Act above, does not establish any authority to conduct investigations, 
and an informal committee is established by the Minister to investigate a particular dumping 
case. Comprehensive procedural rules to be followed while investigating alleged dumping are 
also missing. The only provision present is the one that gives the Minister the authority to lay 
down the investigative procedure and appoint officials to carry out the determinations. Yet to this 
day the officials have not been appointed.
254
  In light of the said provision, the wide discretion of 
the Minister regarding the procedure can be quite problematic as he could be subject to political 
influence when dealing with a dumping allegation, making the procedure suspicious and opaque.  
 
Other procedural laws provided for in the WTO’s ADA that have been omitted are those 
regarding ‘standing’, applications to initiate an investigation, time limits, due process and 
procedural rights, confidential and non-confidential information, evidence, interested parties, 
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public notices, and the different reviews.
255
  In terms of the ADA, an anti-dumping measure can 
only be applied in the circumstances provided for by Art VI, pursuant to investigations 
commenced in accordance to the ADA.
256
 Therefore, after comparing the Customs and Excise 
Act with the ADA, it can be noted that there is a significant disparity between the two texts. With 
respect to clarity, the legislation provides that all complaints are to be presented to the Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, but in practice from the Ugandan and the Chinese clothing 
experiences in the agricultural sub-sectors, the Kenya Revenue Authority gives the impression 
that it is in charge. It is not quite clear from whom an interested party should seek assistance.  
 
For that reason it is necessary to create a comprehensive framework that is clearly definitive of 
the procedures to be carried out, the functions of the authorities, and the available remedies, so 
that interested parties, such as, local producers, suspected exporters, investors, employees and 
consumers, will not only have confidence in such a system where policies are transparent but 
there will also be a reduction in disputes over unclear procedures.   Sections 125 and 126 of the 
Customs and Excise Act are the only provisions dealing with dumping, and additionally, 
subsidies as well. The two sections have been muddled together causing them to appear crowded, 
thus creating an unnecessary disorder for the user. A user of the legislation is required to keep 
going back to find the sections that refer to dumping among the provisions relating to subsidies. 
Moreover, this also dilutes the model provided by the ADA which is exclusively for dumping.
257
 
 
Why has Kenya not utilised its Customs and Excise Act to deal with some of the problems that 
have been ongoing for almost a decade? The Customs and Excise Act is to a great extent in 
conflict with what the ADA and Art VI provide, and thus in using it to impose anti-dumping 
measures under its arrangement, Kenya faces a threat of a dispute in the WTO.  In addition, the 
rules are complex in nature and the high costs involved as well as the technical difficulties of 
pursuing investigations further complicate matters.
258
   
                                                             
255Mosoti V& Gobena A International Trade Rules and the Agriculture Sector: Selected Implementation Issues 
(2007)220. 
256 See Art 1 of the ADA. 
257 Katasi G ‘The Inadequacy of Kenya’s Anti-dumping Law, Regulations and Administrative Procedures under the 
WTO/GATT 1994 Framework available at http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke:8080/handle/123456789/4555 (accessed 
12 March 2013). 
258 Solutions for Dealing with Import Surges and Dumping available at 
http://aprodev.eu/files.../807_technical_interpretation_policy paper_final.pdf  (accessed 25 April 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 48  
 
Although anti-dumping laws in Kenya have never been used, its commitments made at the 
multilateral level have to be implemented through reform of its domestic law and institutions. Its 
existing framework must be changed, and new laws drafted together with proper administrative 
procedures. 
 
3.5 DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE COMMON MARKET FOR 
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (COMESA) AND THE EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY (EAC)  
 
In 2011 at a conference held in Nairobi the Trade Minister, Chirau Ali Mwakwere, said that an 
anti-dumping Bill was expected to be tabled in parliament, which was not only compatible with 
the WTO disciplines but also with the regional trade blocs, the EAC and the COMESA, to enable 
Kenya to be integrated into the multilateral system with proper means to enforce anti-dumping 
laws.
259
  It is therefore important to briefly look at the laws and procedures of the two blocs, to 
both of which Kenya belongs, as permitted by Art XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling 
Clause, to form preferential regimes, and to determine if they have been incorporated into the 
Kenyan domestic law. It should be noted, however, that since the regulations of the COMESA 
and the EAC have common anti-dumping regulations and procedures, a repetition thereof will be 
avoided. 
 
 The East African Community (EAC) 
 
The Customs Union, which is composed of Kenya (which became a member in 2005), Uganda, 
Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda, has a legal framework which consists of the Treaty for its 
establishment, the Customs Union Protocol and the Customs Management Act 2004.
260
 This 
legal structure ensures that there is uniformity among partner states and governs trade areas, such 
as, anti-dumping, subsidies and dispute settlement, among others.
261
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The Protocol gives the guidelines for the determination of dumping, which include the 
calculation and comparison of the normal and export prices, injury, and carrying out 
investigations, which are all similar to the WTO’s ADA.262  Should alleged dumping be found to 
be in existence, the Protocol provides in Annex IV that anti-dumping measures, which include 
price undertakings, provisional measures and collection of anti-dumping duties, may be imposed 
on the exporter.
263
  The EAC rules are somewhat unique in that the partner states are required to 
co-operate with one another in the detection and investigation of dumping, and the imposition of 
anti-dumping measures.
264
 
 
The Customs Union which provides for a nine member committee on trade remedies will only 
begin operations to handle anti-dumping this year (2013).
265
  It has the authority to initiate 
investigations through the investigating authorities of the partner states, to recommend 
provisional measures where necessary, and to offer advice and issue public notices. It also 
administers and manages the dispute settlement system.
266
 Similar to the ADA, interested parties 
are notified of the initiation of an investigation and questionnaires are used in investigations. 
267
 
 
Kenya has integrated s117 of the East African Community Customs and Management Act 
(EACMA) of 2004 into its law.
268
 The EACMA has a limitation in that it only applies to 
dumping within the EAC; thus it does not offer protection against goods dumped from other 
parts of the world. Section 117 states that any goods that enter the territory of Kenya in 
contravention of the conditions of importation will be liable for duty from the date of 
importation, and any security required by the officers during entry must be paid and will be 
discharged upon payment of the duty.
269
   As was stated earlier the Kenya Revenue Authority 
deals with dumping issues in Kenya and is the user of this provision when collecting duties.  
                                                             
262  See Annex IV: Reg 7-9 and 20 of the EAC Anti-dumping Regulations. 
263 See Annex IV: Reg 12-14 of the EAC Anti-dumping Regulations. 
264 See Art 20 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Custom Union. 
265Denner W ‘Trade Policy Review of the EAC’ available at   http://www.tralac.org/2012/11/28/trade-policy-
review-of-the-east-african-community/ (accessed 10 March 2013). 
266 See Art 24 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Custom Union. 
267 See Annex IV: Reg 11 of the EAC Anti-dumping Regulations. 
268 Katasi G ‘The Inadequacy of Kenya’s Anti-dumping Law, Regulations and Administrative Procedures under the 
WTO/GATT 1994 Framework’ available at http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke:8080/handle/123456789/4555 (accessed 
12 March 2013). 
269 See s117 (5) of the East African Community Customs and Management Act. 
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While reg 5 of the Customs Protocol provides for party states with national anti-dumping 
legislation to harmonise them with the provisions of the regulations, Kenya has not clearly 
complied with this requirement. To some extent one is left to wonder whether Kenya really has 
legislation because the present Customs and Excise Act is too weak to combat anti-dumping 
issues effectively. This piece of legislation needs a complete revision and not merely a few 
amendments here and there. The domestic legislation of the EAC can be criticised based on the 
fact that its Committee on Trade Remedies which is involved in the handling of anti-dumping 
and subsidies matters is only expected to begin operations in 2013.
270
  This begs the question as 
to what would have happened if the party states wanted to impose anti-dumping duties using the 
EAC regulations. 
 
 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 
Under the COMESA framework there are sufficient guidelines on the implementation of anti-
dumping as a trade remedy against unfair trade practices. Article 51 of the COMESA Treaty 
prohibits dumped imports from one member state into another as well as those from third 
countries into a member state, and allows the imposition of anti-dumping duties (not greater in 
amount than the dumping margin) where material injury has been caused by dumping to an 
established industry in the territory of another member state.
271
  An important difference to take 
note of is that, while the WTO condemns the act of dumping and only has jurisdiction over its 
Members, COMESA on the other hand prohibits the practice and may levy an anti-dumping duty 
against a non member state (third country).
272
  
 
Articles 51.1-51.4 provides for the determination of dumping and the procedures to be followed 
which are parallel to those of the ADA.
273
  In addition it also states that before initiation of the 
first action by a member state it must have established its procedure for taking action and 
identified a competent authority to carry out investigations of the conditions preceding the anti-
                                                             
270Denner W ‘Trade Policy Review of The EAC’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/11/28/trade-policy-review-
of-the-east-african-community/ (accessed 10 March 2013). 
271 See Arts 51.1, 51.3 & 51.5 of the COMESA Treaty. 
272 See Art 2 of the COMESA Treaty. 
273 Denner W Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa-Review of Select Issues: Protectionism, 
Trade Remedies and Safe guards (2010) 23; See Arts 51.1-51.4 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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dumping action.
274
  This means that, similar to the ADA, it allows its member states to utilise 
municipal laws. Co-operation during the detection and investigation, and the imposition of the 
anti-dumping measures, is required of the member states, a provision common to the EAC.
275
  
 
Kenya has neither utilised the COMESA anti-dumping rules nor included them in its domestic 
legislation. However, looking at the EAC and the COMESA legislations discussed above, Kenya 
would be in a better position utilising the COMESA intra-regional anti-dumping rules 
temporarily to protect local industries from the import surges before finalising the anti-dumping 
Bill which is still being deliberated. This is because the COMESA rules provide broader cover in 
terms of third countries, unlike the EAC which only covers dumping within the Customs Union 
subjecting foreign complaints to the application of the WTO’s ADA.276  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
To ensure and enhance national and international fair competition for Kenyan products it is 
important for the Kenyan Government to restructure its anti-dumping policy. The reformation of 
domestic anti-dumping regulations is now both a global and a developing country’s issue- to 
assist countries to improve their international competitiveness. From the discussion above, it is 
evident that Kenya lacks clear laws to deal with dumping and this failure has resulted in very 
adverse effects.  
 
It is therefore important for Kenya to join other developing countries in the introduction of 
legislation compatible with the WTO, and, for regional harmony, the COMESA and the EAC, in 
order to be able to use measures to contain the harmful effects of its imports now and in the 
future. 
  
                                                             
274 Denner W Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa-Review of Select Issues: Protectionism, 
Trade Remedies and Safe guards (2010) 4. 
275 See Art 54(1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
276 See Art 54(2) of the COMESA Treaty; Annex IV: Reg 4 of the EAC Anti-dumping Regulations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A CASE STUDY ON THE USE OF ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
On the African continent, South Africa (SA) not only has the most developed and diversified 
economy but is also historically the main user of the anti-dumping laws in defence of its 
domestic industries, accounting for 75 per cent  of anti-dumping initiations and more than 70 per 
cent of applied measures between 1995 and 2011.
277
   Its industrial sector, which was founded in 
the late 19
th
 century,
278
 has replaced agriculture as the major driver of economic activity, and due 
to that and other factors it has focused its investigations and duties on some imported ‘like 
products’, for example, plastic and rubber (17%), chemicals (14%), and base metals (27%), in 
order to protect its domestic industries, with its biggest targets being the EU, China, India, South 
Korea and Taiwan.
279
 
 
Developed countries have traditionally been the major users of trade remedies including anti-
dumping. Only in 1914, after New Zealand and Australia in 1905 and 1906, respectively, did 
South Africa enact its own anti-dumping laws and seven years later it imposed its first anti-
dumping duty on flour from Australia.
280
   Pre-1914 South Africa had no law to control dumping. 
It related with other countries on the basis of the political and economic ideas of the colonial 
powers, that is, the Dutch and later the British.
281
   
                                                             
277 Illy O ‘Trade Remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges, and Prospects’ Working Paper available at 
http://ebookbrowse.com/illy-trade-remedies-in-africa-pdf-d370532454  (accessed 7 October 2012). 
278 Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade, Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping in Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005) 49. 
279 Illy O ‘Trade Remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges, and Prospects’ Working Paper available at 
http://ebookbrowse.com/illy-trade-remedies-in-africa-pdf-d370532454  (accessed 7 October 2012). 
280 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 12 December 2012). 
281 Smit P, Dams J, Mostert J, Oosthuizen G, Van der Vyvertc V& Van Gass W Economics: A Southern African 
perspective (1996) 455. 
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In 1914 the Customs and Tariffs Act was enacted as South Africa’s first anti-dumping law, 
followed by the establishment of the Board of Trade and Industry in 1923 which was responsible 
for investigating dumping and enforcing anti-dumping regulations.
282
    
 
The Board of Trade and Industry was later replaced by the Board on Tariffs and Trade in 
September 1986, and in 1992 a directorate to deal with dumping issues was formed within the 
Trade and Industry Department to assist the Board in conducting dumping and countervailing 
investigations.
283
  It can be noted that after 1992 anti-dumping duties escalated in comparison to 
all other previous years. For example, in 1993-2003, SA as an exporter faced 34 anti-dumping 
measures while it applied 108, expressing a ratio of 0:31, and making it the fifth largest anti-
dumping user after the USA, the EU, India and Argentina.
284
 The success of South Africa’s 
domestic anti-dumping laws can be attributed to being in harmony with the ADA, a transition 
which began way back in 1995 when the Board on Tariffs and  Trade Act
285
  was amended to 
include the definitions of ‘dumping’, ‘export price’, ‘normal value’, ‘fair comparison’, and 
incorporated clearer procedures  to achieve harmonisation with the ADA. The WTO’s ADA 
requires that Members who wish to apply anti-dumping measures can only do so in terms of the 
provisions of Art VI of the GATT 1994, and after investigations initiated and conducted 
according to the Agreement.
 286
  According to Petersen, the new guidelines set the limit of SA’s 
anti-dumping law and the Act refurbished it in order for the country to achieve compliance with 
its GATT obligations.
 287
    
 
As required by the ADA Art 18.5, SA in 1995 notified the WTO of the Board on Tariffs and 
Trade Act and the applicable provisions of the Customs Act as its national anti-dumping 
                                                             
282 See s4 of the Board of Trade and Industry Amendment Act 1992.  
283 Joubert N ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: The Reform of South Africa’s Anti-Dumping 
Regime’ available at http//www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case38_e.htm#remedies (accessed 25 
September 2012). 
284 Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade, Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping in Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005)55; Edwards L ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa: From 
Proliferation to Moderation’ available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871948 (accessed 7 
December 2012). 
285 See Board on Tariffs and Trade Amendment Act 39 of 1995. 
286 See Art 1 of the ADA. 
287 Petersen C ‘Africa’s Dumping Grounds: South Africa’s Struggle against Unfair Trade’ (1996) Boston University 
International Law Journal 394. 
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legislation.
288
  The Board on Tariffs and Trade Act was later repealed in 2003 by the 
International Trade Administration Act (ITAA). Anti-Dumping Regulations (ADR) made under 
s59, were to guide the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) while carrying 
out anti-dumping investigations, and as a consequence maintain compliance with the WTO.
289
  
 
The ADR provide for substantive and procedural anti-dumping requirements.  It should be noted 
that, although South Africa is a contracting and founding Member of the WTO, interestingly, all 
the WTO Agreements including the ADA and Article VI do not form part of SA’s law because 
the Agreements have only been ratified by parliament but not been promulgated as municipal 
law.
290
  This means that no rights can be derived from these Agreements.  Nevertheless, the 
South African Constitution
291
  which is the supreme law of the land states that when a court or 
tribunal is interpreting any legislation, it must prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation 
that is consistent with international law.
292
 
 
In recent years anti-dumping practices have not only become very widespread, but WTO 
Members from developing countries have also joined the trend of adopting anti-dumping 
legislation. Some are now the most frequent users of anti-dumping legislation, for example, 
India, Egypt, Brazil, and Turkey, while others have become major targets, like China.
293
  
 
Therefore, as anti-dumping practices become  even more popular as a trade instrument, and new 
Members, like Kenya, are in the process of drafting national anti-dumping laws, it is necessary to 
look at the experience of an African developing country, like South Africa, that has successfully 
applied anti-dumping measures in recent years, and draw some lessons on how to improve anti-
                                                             
288 WTO Report ‘South Africa Notification’ G/ADP/N/1/ZAF/1; G/SCM/N/1/ZAF/1/ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/south_africa_e.htm (accessed 17 December 2012). 
289 See s7 of the ITA Act; Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 12 December 2012). 
290 Ndlovu L ‘An Assessment of the WTO Compliance of the Recent Regulatory Regime of South Africa’s 
Dumping and Anti-dumping Law’ (2010) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 5, Issue 1  
32. 
291 See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
292 See s233 of the Constitution Act 1996. 
293 Theron N Anti-dumping: A Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007) 69. 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 55  
 
dumping policies to be more consistent with WTO regulations, and how to effectively defend 
itself in case it is targeted and anti-dumping investigations are initiated.
294
  
 
This chapter will attempt to examine the legislative and institutional framework of the South 
African anti-dumping system, its substantive content, the procedures to be followed by interested 
parties as well as the ITAC throughout the investigation process, the reviews available, and lastly 
some general identified problems which restrict the proper effectiveness of this system.  
 
4.2 THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
 
4.2.1 Legislative structure 
 
The key anti-dumping legislation in South Africa is the ITAA
295
 which replaced the Boards on 
Tariffs and Trade Act.
296
  Its adoption by parliament as law was preceded by a series of joint 
briefings, public hearings by the parliamentary Committee on Trade and Industry and the 
Economic Affairs Select Committee to explain the basis of the Act to the stakeholders as well as 
address any of their concerns, and submissions made on behalf of the private sector and 
organised labour.
297
 The consultations between government and stakeholders enhanced and made 
effective the whole policy making process. The ITAA provides for the formation of the ITAC, 
the specialised agency responsible for anti-dumping investigations
298
 ; the definitions of 
‘dumping’,299 ‘normal value’,300 and ‘export price’;301 the management of confidential 
information;
302
 and how applications can be submitted to the ITAC and considered.
303
  In 
addition, the substantive and procedural rules are made available in the ADR.  
                                                             
294 Theron N Anti-dumping: A Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007) 70. 
 
295See International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. 
296 See Board on Tariffs and Trade Act 107 of 1986. 
297 Joubert N ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: The Reform of South Africa’s Anti-Dumping 
Regime’ available at http//www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case38_e.htm#remedies (accessed 25 
September 2012). 
298 See s16 of the ITA Act. 
299 See s 1(2) of the ITA Act. 
300 See s 32(2) (b) of the ITA Act. 
301 See s 32(2) (a) of the ITA Act. 
302See s 33-37of the ITA Act.  
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The Customs and Excise Act is also important in dumping and anti-dumping matters because it 
imposes anti-dumping duties in the form of provisional payments in terms of chapter VI
304
  at the 
request of the ITAC, and definitive measures at the request of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
at a level and for a period stated in such request.
305
  
 
Apart from ITAA and the Customs and Excise Act, there are also several other pieces of 
legislation that have a connection with how anti-dumping is regulated in South Africa.
306
 First is 
the supreme law of the country, the Constitution,
307
 with which all laws must comply, as well as 
other Acts that complement the rights it grants.
308
  With respect to anti-dumping, the important 
sections are those that assure individuals of their right to ‘reasonable and fair procedures’ during 
administration actions
309
 (also referred to in the Promotion of Administration of Justice Act 
(PAJA)
310
 and access to any information held by the state under certain circumstances
311
  (also 
referred in the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA).
312
  Secondly, there is the right to 
written reasons where an individual’s rights have been greatly affected by an administrative 
action.
313
 Lastly, the requirement of the courts to interpret municipal laws in accordance with 
International Law.
314
    
 
In the Brenco case,
315
 the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of interpreting national 
laws in line with international law with respect to anti-dumping when it held that the point was 
not that the investigating authority was obliged to comply as a matter of law with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
303 See s26 of the ITA Act; Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 12 December 2012).   
304 See the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. 
305Ndlovu L ‘An Assessment of the WTO Compliance of the Recent Regulatory Regime of South Africa’s Dumping 
and Anti-dumping Law’ (2010) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 5, Issue 1  5. 
306 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
307 See the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
308 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
309 See s 33 of the Constitution. 
310 See the Promotion of Administration of Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
311 See s 32(c) of the Constitution. 
312 See the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
313 See s 33(2) of the Constitution. 
314 See s231 and s233 of the Constitution. 
315 Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade v Brenco 2001(4) SA 511 (SCA); Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South 
Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 13 December 2012). 
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International Agreements-Tokyo code 1979 and the ADA, but that international practice was of 
some help in assessing the fairness of the investigating authority in conducting anti-dumping 
investigations.
316
 
 
4.2.2 Institutional structure 
 
In 1995 the body responsible for anti-dumping investigations was established under the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade Act
317
  and existed until 2003 when the Act was revoked and responsibility 
shifted to the ITAC. The ITAA
318
 established an independent body to regulate and govern 
international trade instruments, a move motivated by the Department of Trade and Industry, to 
improve its efficiency by isolating implementation from other functions, as well as fulfilling its 
purpose.
319
 The ITAC is a juristic person with authority throughout SA, is subject only to the 
Constitution, the law and any trade policy statement or directive issued by the Minister in terms 
of the ITAA, and is expected to perform its duties in an impartial manner without fear, favour or 
unfairness.
320
     
 
The ITAC has been mandated to investigate and evaluate dumping in SA and the jurisdictions of 
the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) whose Members are South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. It has also been appointed to act as the regional trade remedy 
investigating authority for the Custom Union as it awaits a regional body to be formed.
321
 
Although the market concerned in an investigation conducted by the ITAC is the SACU one, 
anti-dumping investigations are in actual fact concerned with the SA market seeking protection 
because of its dominance in the Custom Union.
322
   
                                                             
316 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
317 See s39 of the Board on Tariffs and Trade Act. 
318 See the International Trade Act 71 of 2002. 
319 See s2 of the ITA Act; Tao M Dumping and Anti-Dumping Regulations with Specific Reference to the Legal 
Framework in South Africa and China ( Unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Free State, 2006) 53. 
320 See s7 of the ITA Act. 
321 See s16 of the ITA Act; Illy O ‘Trade Remedies in Africa: Experience, Challenges, and Prospects’ Working 
Paper available at http://ebookbrowse.com/illy-trade-remedies-in-africa-pdf-d370532454  (accessed 7 October 
2012).  
322 Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade, Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping in Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005) 59. 
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It should be noted that SA and not the SACU reports investigations to the WTO even if the 
market protection involves the Union, because the SACU is not a WTO Member ; nor likely to 
be, only the individual SACU Member states are.
323
  This differs from the EU whose 
Commission speaks for all its member states in that customs union. 
 
The ITAC is directed by a full-time chief commissioner, assisted by a full-time deputy chief 
commissioner and  between two and ten other part-or full-time commissioners (currently they are 
six)
324
  who are suitably qualified in economics, accounting, law, commerce, agriculture, 
industry or public affairs.
325
  The ITAC has a division responsible for trade remedies, including 
anti-dumping,
326
 which is headed and accounted for by the two directorates with a team of 
investigators, which they appoint, and other support staff to investigate dumping, analyse any 
injury and establish a causal link.
327
 The functions of the ITAC and those of the investigators 
differ in that the latter carry out the anti-dumping investigations and submit reports to the 
commissioners who are obliged by law to take decisions in meetings.
328
  While the ITAA 
requires members of the ITAC to be holders of the above-listed qualifications, Brink conversely 
is of the opinion that this requirement has not been fulfilled by the investigating officers, stating 
that presently there is only one skilled accountant and none are lawyers or has experience outside 
the civil service.
329
 
 
Since the ITAC is fully responsible for all investigations, if it makes a finding that dumping is 
causing material injury; it can make a request to the commissioner of the revenue authority, the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS), to impose a provisional payment for the period and for 
                                                             
323 Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade, Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping in Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005)59. 
324 Yilmaz M& Brink G Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies: Experiences of the Most Active WTO 
Members-South Africa, A Complicated, Unpredictable, Long and Costly Judicial Review System (2013) 250. 
325 See s 8 and 9 of the ITA Act. 
326 See s16 of the ITA Act. 
327 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
328 Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade, Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping in Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005)58. 
329 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 15 December 2012). 
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an amount requested.
330
 After affirmation of a final determination by the ITAC, it makes a 
recommendation for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry who then requests the Minister of Finance to impose the appropriate anti-dumping 
duty.
331
  After all is said and done, the final recommendations should be made to the SACU tariff 
board which makes a suggestion to the Custom Union council of Ministers.
332
   
As of 2013, the Tariff board had not been formed, and therefore the ITAC continues to have the 
authority to deal with anti-dumping issues on behalf of the Custom Union.
333
  
 
4.3 THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 
 
The ITAA and its ADR generally follow the provisions of the ADA because of SA’s 
membership of the WTO, although there are several procedural rules which will be discussed 
that are stricter than those in the WTO’s ADA, while others are not in full compliance there 
with.
334
  Under South African law, an anti-dumping action cannot take place unless it is shown 
that goods are exported into the country or the SACU region at a price that is less than the 
normal value
335
 - which is the selling price in the exporting country,
336
  and that as a 
consequence material injury is caused to the domestic industries due to the dumping and not 
other external factors.         
 
4.3.1 Export Price 
 
The determination of the export price is normally the first thing to be done in an anti-dumping 
investigation. This is based on the fact that since the exported product is the one being 
                                                             
330 See s57A (1) of the Customs and Excise Act ; Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis 
Nexis vol 5 257.  
331 See s55 (2) and 56(1) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
332 See s57A (1) of the Customs and Excise Act ; Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis 
Nexis vol 5 257.  
333 Edwards L ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa: From Proliferation to Moderation’ available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871948 (accessed 7 December 2012). 
334 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 15 December 2012). 
335 See s1(2) of the ITA Act. 
336 See s32(2) (a) of the ITA Act. 
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investigated, then all evaluations should be made of this product and its price.
337
  Brink is of the 
opinion that in practice SA’s ITAC conversely determines the normal value first and then the 
export price in an investigation.
 338
 The ITAA defines the ‘export price’ as the ‘price actually 
paid or payable for goods sold for export, net of all taxes discounts and rebates actually granted 
and directly related to that sale’.339   If there is no export price, or where there appears to be an 
association or compensatory arrangement between the exporter or foreign manufacturer and the 
importer in respect of the export price (sale between related parties), or where the export price 
paid or payable is unreliable,
340
  then the export price must be constructed on the basis of the 
price at which the imports are first re-sold to an independent buyer, if appropriate, or on a 
reasonable basis.
341
  From this constructed export price on the basis of the price at which the 
imports are first re-sold to an independent buyer, deductions must be made of actual or allocated 
costs incurred between the exporter’s ex-factory price and the first independent re-sale price and 
any reasonable profit.
342
  
 
 4.3.2 Normal value 
 
The ‘normal value’ is calculated upon the export price being determined. According to the ITAA 
this value is defined as the ‘comparable price paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade for 
like goods intended for consumption in the exporting country or the country of origin or in the 
absence of information on a price contemplated above then the normal price can be determined 
either on the basis of: 
 
a) the cost of production of the goods in the country of origin when destined for domestic 
consumption, plus a reasonable addition for selling, general and administrative costs and for 
profit; or 
                                                             
337 See s57A (1) of the Customs and Excise Act ; Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis 
Nexis vol 5 257-8. 
338 See s57A (1) of the Customs and Excise Act ;  Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis 
Nexis vol 5 258. 
339 See s32(2) of the ITA Act. 
340 See  s32(6) of the ITA Act. 
341 See s32(5) (6) of the ITA Act. 
342 See the ADR 1 & 10.3. 
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b) the highest comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third or 
surrogate country, as long as that price is representative.’343  The ADR provide for the 
determination of the above selling, general and administration costs and profit where the normal 
value is constructed.
344
  From the definition provided it can be simply said that the normal value 
in terms of SA law can either be obtained on the basis of domestic sales in the exporting country 
or through a constructed value. 
 
A constructed normal price usually causes problems to arise. According to Vermulst, this method 
was once used by the traditional users of anti-dumping to inflate the dumping margin, but that in 
real dumping scenarios the margins would be adequately high without a need to falsely inflate 
them.
345
  This is completely the opposite of the position in SA where through experience it has 
been seen that constructed normal values result in no or lower margins despite clear provisions 
on its construction in the ADR.
346
  Nonetheless, the constructed normal price has been used by 
the ITAC in a number of cases, for example, the Picks, Shovels and Spades, Rakes and Forks 
Originating from the Peoples Republic of China, where the normal value was constructed using 
costs in SACU as the ITAC was of the opinion that the costs of production in China and of the 
SACU industries were similar.
347
 
 
For countries which have non-market economies, like Russia and China, the ITAC provides for 
the use of a normal value in a third or surrogate country as seen in (b) above, to establish the 
normal value of goods.
348
 In the case of ITAC v SATMC the Supreme Court found that the ITAC 
did not have to conduct an investigation into whether foreign manufacturers from countries like 
China operated under market conditions even if the domestic industry had submitted such 
                                                             
343 See s32(2) (b) of the ITA Act. 
344 See the ADR 8.12 & 8.13. 
345 Vermulst E ‘Adopting and Implementing Anti-dumping Laws’ (1997) Journal of World Trade vol 31(2)  18; 
Theron N Anti-dumping: A  Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007)72.  
346 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
347 ITAC ‘General Notice 245’ available at www.itac.org.za/docs/Notice%20245%20of%202007.pdf  (accessed 14 
December 2012). 
348 See s 32(4) of the ITA Act. 
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information.
349
 One question though: if there is no third country or surrogate country available, 
what happens then? 
 
4.3.3 Fair comparison 
 
The ITAC is required by the ITAA and the ADR to make a ‘fair comparison’ between the 
normal value and the export price.
350
  It entails make proper adjustments so that a comparison 
between the two prices can be made, which includes differences in the conditions and terms of 
sale, differences in taxation, and other differences affecting price comparability.
351
 Additional 
guidelines with respect to fair comparison are provided for but not limited in the ADR. They 
include: conditions and terms of trade,
352
  taxation,
353
  levels of trade,
354
  physical 
characteristics,
355
 and quantities.
356
     
 
Practically, according to Brink several problems have been experienced due to the ITAC’s 
inconsistency when making the adjustments. He cites the Tyres- China
357
 investigation, where 
the ITAC granted adjustments for differences in advertising costs, general costs and 
administration costs, but refused to do the same in the following investigations; as well as the 
ITAC’s continued failure to make adjustments for bank charges incurred by an exporter in 
conversion of his currency to the Rand.
358
 
 
  
                                                             
349 ITAC V SATMC 2011 ZASCA 137 ; Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
350 See s32(3) of the ITA Act; ADR 11. 
351 See s32(3) of the ITA Act. 
352 See the ADR 11.1(a).  
353 See the ADR 11.1(b). 
354 See the ADR 11.1(c). 
355 See  the ADR 11.1(d). 
356 See  the ADR 11.1(e). 
357 ITAC V SA Tyre Manufacturer’s Conference ZASCA 137. 
358 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/ (accessed 14 December 2012). 
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4.3.4 Margin of dumping 
 
In the legislation, the ‘margin of dumping’ is defined as ‘the extent to which the normal value is 
higher than the export price, after adjustments have been made for comparative purposes’.359 
This is the determination used where only one product is under investigation.
360
  In cases where 
there are different models of the same product in SA, the determination of the dumping margin 
can be a difficult issue. An example of such is ‘bed linen’ which may be made up of fitted sheets, 
flat sheets, duvet covers etc.
361
  In such scenarios all the models are deemed to be the product 
under investigation, nevertheless a normal value, export price and the margin of dumping is 
determined separately for each model including the model within the model, for example, the 
king size, queen and double sheets.  The margins will then be weighted to determine a single 
margin applicable to each product under investigation.
362
  SARS has previously imposed 
separate duties on various bed linen models notwithstanding a weighted average margin for each 
model; hence a weighted average of dumping was determined for all sheets, another for duvets 
and pillow cases.
363
  This is in contrast to EC- Bed Linen
364
  where the WTO Appellate Body 
held that in respect of a product under investigation as defined by the investigating authorities, 
only a single margin of dumping may be determined in respect to that product.
365
 In this case it 
should be ‘bed linen’, not the different types of sheets, like king size etc.    
 
4.3.5 Material injury  
 
In order to impose an anti-dumping duty the investigating authorities determine the second leg, 
which is actual material injury, a threat, or a material retardation to the domestic industry 
                                                             
359 See the ADR 1-definitions. 
360 See the ADR 12.1. 
361 Brink G ‘Determining the Weighted Average Margin of Dumping’ TRALAC Working Paper available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2011/05/11/determining -the-weighted-average-margin-of-dumping/ (accessed 3 January 
2013). 
362 See  the ADR 12.2 (b)(ii) ; Brink G ‘Determining the Weighted Average Margin of Dumping’ TRALAC 
Working Paper available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/05/11/determining -the-weighted-average-margin-of-
dumping/ (accessed 3 January 2013). 
363 Brink G ‘Determining the Weighted Average Margin of Dumping’ TRALAC Working Paper available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2011/05/11/determining -the-weighted-average-margin-of-dumping/ (accessed 3 January 
2013). 
364 EC-Bed Linen WT/DS141/AB/R   par 51-53. 
365 EC-Bed Linen WT/DS141/AB/R par 51-53. 
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producing a like product to the imported goods.
366
  In the ITAA there is no reference to material 
injury
367
 which was previously required by the Customs and Excise Act.
368
  However, the ADR 
provide that in the determination of material injury the ITAC shall consider whether there has 
been significant  suppression/depression in SACU prices or change in the domestic performance 
of the SACU industry in respect to the following injury factors: sales volume, profit and loss, 
output, market share, productivity, return on investments, capacity utilisation, cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investment, and any other 
factors placed before the ITAC that are relevant.
369
   
 
The ADR does not particularly require an establishment of injury to the domestic industry before 
imposing anti-dumping measures (which has been the case since 1992) but it implies that the 
ITAC must consider injury through the 13 factors listed above.
370
  The ITAC’s investigation 
reports ‘provide only the summarised indications to each item of the injury determination, 
referring to indexed data such as tables’ which result in merely listing and providing data that do 
not meet the ADA requirements of making an evaluation of the facts.
 371
   In the WTO Egypt- 
Steel Rebar case,
372
 the Panel held that an investigating authority must not only gather data but 
must also analyse and interpret it concerning any factor in Art 3.4-which deals with 
determination of the impact of dumped products on the local industries. 
 
While no one of the factors listed above is considered superior to the other, but are regarded as 
mere guiding factors, according to the ITAC three factors could play a decisive role in the 
determination of injury.
373
  These factors are: price suppression which occurs when there is an 
increase in the cost to price ratio of the SACU industry or where the industry sells at a loss 
                                                             
366 See the ADR 13&14. 
367 Brink G ‘Determining the Weighted Average Margin of Dumping’ TRALAC Working Paper available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2011/05/11/determining -the-weighted-average-margin-of-dumping/ (accessed 3 January 
2013). 
368 See s82(1) of the Customs and Excise Act 35 of 1994; Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 14 December 2012). 
369 See the ADR 13. 
370 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 15 December 2012). 
371 Junji N &Brink G Anti-dumping Laws and Practices of the New Users (2007) 221. 
372 WTO Panel Report Egypt-Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey WT/DS211/R.   
373 Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis Nexis vol 5 263. 
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during the investigation period;
374
 profit;  and price depression which occurs where the ‘SACU 
industry’s  ex factory selling price decreases during the investigation period’.375  The Board on 
Tariffs and Trade, which was replaced by the ITAC, held in the case of Rhône Poulenc v 
Chairman of the Board
376
  that price undercutting, price depression and decline in profits were 
the major determinants of injury in an anti-dumping investigation. 
 
4.3.6 Causation 
 
Some countries, like New Zealand and Turkey, do not distinguish clearly in their anti-dumping 
laws between injury determination and causation.
377
  In SA, these are plainly separate, and 
causation is the last factor to be proven as the ADR require. It must be established that material 
injury is caused by the dumped imports, before any anti-dumping measures are imposed.
378
       
In addition several factors shall be considered by the ITAC when determining a causal link 
between material injury and dumping.  These are: the change in volume of dumped imports, 
price undercutting, market share of dumped imports, the magnitude of the margin of dumping, 
and the price of un-dumped imports in the market.
379
 The ITAC is allowed to consider other 
factors in the determination of causality only in instances where an interested party has submitted 
those other factors or where the ITAC on its own has identified those factors.
380
 
 
4.3.7 Lesser duty rule 
 
The ADA, in Art 9 states that it is desirable that the duty be less than the dumping margin if such 
lesser duty would be enough to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
381
  From the word 
‘desirable’ it means that the provision is not mandatory and it does not specify how to calculate 
the lesser duty. Therefore countries are free to choose whether and how to implement the lesser 
                                                             
374 See the ADR 1. 
375 See the ADR 1. 
376 Rhône Poulenc v Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade 1998/6589 37(T).  
377Theron N Anti-Dumping: A  Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007) 75. 
378 See the ADR 16.4. 
379 See the ADR 16.1. 
380 See the ADR 16.5. 
381Theron N Anti-dumping: A Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007)77. 
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duty. In South Africa, the ADR defines ‘lesser duty’ as the provisional payment or anti-dumping 
duty imposed at the ‘lesser of the margin of dumping or margin of injury’ which is sufficient to 
remove the injury caused by dumping.
382
  Formally the ITAC is under no mandatory obligation 
to apply this rule where the importer and exporter have co-operated in an investigation; however, 
in practice it does.
383
 South Africa has used the lesser duty rule in almost all investigations 
carried out by it. For example, in the Circuit-Breakers from France, Spain, Italy and Japan, 
where the Board on Tariffs and Trade stated that in enormously high dumping margins of 
products, imposing the anti-dumping margin would be punitive and would price the parties’ 
products out of the market rather than level the playing field as was the intended result of 
imposing a final duty.
384
 Also in the case of Insecticide containing aldicarb imported from the 
USA there was a huge difference between the dumping margin of 99.3 per cent and the final duty 
established on the lesser duty rule of 11.5 per cent (based on price disadvantage).
385
  The practice 
in South Africa is thus to calculate both the price disadvantage as well as the dumping margin 
and as demonstrated by the insecticide case, the anti-dumping duty based on price disadvantage 
is normally lower than the dumping margin and is considered sufficient to remove the injury or 
level the playing field.
386
 
 
4.3.8 Public interest  
  
Although the ITAC in 2006 published proposed draft amendments, including the public interest 
provisions to the ADR,
387
  promulgation has not yet taken place and South African law still does 
not provide for a public interest clause. However, when determining injury the impact of the duty 
on the local industry, but not to the consumers and the downstream users, is considered.
388
  
                                                             
382 See the ADR 1-Definitions. 
383Kommerskollegium/National Board of Trade, Sweden Report The Use of Anti-dumping in Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa Rules, Trends and Causes (2005)62. 
384Theron N Anti-dumping: A Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007)77. 
385Board on Tariffs and Trade: Final Determination Report No 3789 Investigation into the alleged dumping of an 
insecticide containing Aldicarb originating in and imported from the Unites States of America. 
386 Theron N Anti-dumping: A Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007)78. 
387 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 15 December 2012). 
388 Theron N Anti-dumping: A Global Abuse of Trade Policy Instrument-AD Procedures & Lessons for Developing 
Countries with Special Emphasis on South African Experience (2007)79. 
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As stated in section 4.4.2 below in Paper Board,
389
  it seems that the ITAC used this clause 
without specifically naming it 
390
 when it failed to impose provisional payments despite 
affirmatively finding injurious dumping, because the downstream users would be affected. 
Vermulst recommends that the developing world should have a public interest clause as it would 
provide a ‘safety valve if the anti-dumping action, for whatever reason seems undesirable’.391 
This means that, should countries not need impose a duty in the future, they will have a provision 
for that.  
 
Before the controversial case involving imported whole and boneless chicken cuts from Brazil 
was concluded, there were various arguments against the imposition of anti-dumping duties on 
the imported chicken. The  Brazilian Poultry Association(UBABEF) indicated that the duties 
were purely of a political nature and that the protection offered to the inefficient local producers 
by South Africa would be to the disadvantage of consumers in the SACU who would otherwise 
have benefited from the cheaper imported protein.
392
  The UBABEF further added that South 
Africa imported 16 per cent of the poultry products it consumes, of which 73 per cent came from 
Brazil, and are used as inputs in SA retail products where many South Africans are employed to 
work with the Brazilian meat products across the value chain; therefore a rapid decrease in 
imported poultry products may disrupt rather than boost the local industry.
393
  The general 
manager of local importer Britos Foods was also of the view that the imposition of the anti-
dumping duties was ridiculous and should not be implemented, based on the fact that imported 
chicken made up less than 15 per cent of the total consumption in SA and that the biggest losers 
would be the domestic consumers who would be subject to the actions of domestic producers.
394
 
 
                                                             
389 See ITAC Report 152: Investigation into the alleged dumping of paper and paperboard with a mass of 180g/m2 
or more, but not exceeding 550 g/m2, coated on one side with kaolin clay, commonly known as “white liner” or 
“grey backed paperboard”, originating in or imported from the Republic of Korea. 
390 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 15 December 2012). 
391 Vermulst E ‘Adopting and Implementing Anti-dumping Laws’ (1997) Journal of World Trade vol 31(2) 20. 
392 Viljoen W ‘Anti-dumping Duty on Chicken from Brazil’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/02/15/anti-
dumping-duty-on-chicken-from-brazil (accessed 12 April 2013). 
393 European Lawyers ‘Brazilian Poultry Exporters Challenge South African Anti-dumping Measures’ (2012) 
Fratini vergano issue No 4 2. 
394 Viljoen W ‘Anti-dumping Duty on Chicken from Brazil’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/02/15/anti-
dumping-duty-on-chicken-from-brazil (accessed 12 April 2013). 
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4.4 THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
 
In this section the detailed procedure of how anti-dumping investigations and reviews are carried 
out in South Africa will be discussed, as required by the ADA. The ITAA gives the ITAC the 
mandate to investigate and make an evaluation in response to an application made to them with 
regard to dumping in the territory or in the SACU.
395
 Throughout the process interested parties 
are given adequate notices and chances to make comments on this administrative process as 
required by the PAJA and the Constitution.
396
 
The anti-dumping investigation is comprised of three phases: the pre-initiation phase, the 
initiation and preliminary phase, and the final phase.
397
  
 
4.4.1 The pre-initiation phase 
 
All investigations arise from the acceptance of a written application by or on behalf of the 
relevant domestic industry, although the ITAC may initiate an investigation without receiving an 
application from an interested party.
398
  At any stage, a domestic industry may make a written 
anti-dumping application to the ITAC.
399
 This means that at least 25per cent of the domestic 
producers by production volume support the application and in addition at least 50 per cent by 
production volume of those producers that express an opinion are in support of the application.
400
   
To begin with, the applicant is required to properly submit information that is reasonably 
available including information relating to the product, dumping, material injury and causality.
401
  
 
The ITAC proceeds to verify the information provided to determine if it is accurate and 
adequate,
402
 and a merit submission is written by the investigating officers for consideration by 
the Commissioners if there is sufficient information to establish a prima facie case that material 
                                                             
395 See s16(1) (a) of the ITA Act. 
396 See s3(2) (b) of PAJA & s32(c) of the Constitution. 
397 Junji N& Brink G Anti-dumping Laws and Practices of the New Users (2007)211. 
398 See the ADR 3.1 & 3.3.  
399 Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis Nexis vol 5 265. 
400 See the ADR 7.3 (a) (b.) 
401 See the ADR22&26. 
402 See the ADR 25. 
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injury to the industry is being caused by dumping.
403
  If the ITAC finds that the application has 
merit, it will inform the representatives of the countries to be investigated of its decision before 
the initiation notice.
404
  However, if the application is found to be without merit, it is terminated 
and the applicant is informed with a set of reasons for the rejection.
405
 The applicant may be 
granted an oral hearing, upon a request to discuss the reasons for the rejection.
406
  
 
4.4.2 The initiation and preliminary phase 
 
Upon the anti-dumping investigation being formally initiated by publishing a notice in the 
Government Gazette, (generally published on a Friday, unless the day falls on a public holiday in 
which case it is published on the last working day prior to the holiday),
407
 the ITAC informs all 
known interested parties and supplies them with a copy of the notice, and questionnaires to be 
completed.
408
  According to Junji & Brink, the ITAC has developed standardised questionnaires 
and no adjustments are made to them to address individual cases or different types of products.
409
  
 
The parties have 37 days from the date of receiving the questionnaires to complete and submit 
their responses,
410
  and 40 days from the date of publication of the notice, for those that were not 
directly informed of the investigation by the ITAC.
411
  An extension of 14 days is possible, but 
only granted for a good reason and is applicable only to those parties that the ITAC allows.
412
 
Once the submissions by the interested parties (exporter and importer) have been received, the 
ITAC examines them for any deficiencies and sends a letter to the specific party setting out all 
the deficiencies, which include a failure to submit any relevant information, an omission to 
provide proper non-confidential versions of submissions, and failure to submit responses in both 
                                                             
403 See the ADR 26. 
404 See the ADR 27. 
405 See the ADR 26.2. 
406 See the ADR 26.3. 
407 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/ (accessed 29 January 2013). 
408 See the ADR 28.1& 28.3. 
409 Junji N & Brink G Anti-dumping Laws and Practices of the New Users (2007) 211. 
410 See the ADR 29.2& 29.3. 
411 See the ADR 29.4. 
412 See the ADR 30; Brink G Anti-dumping and Countervailing Investigations in South Africa: A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the Practice and Procedures of the Board on Tariffs and Trade (2002) 192. 
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hard and soft copies.
413
  These have to be rectified within seven days from the date of receiving 
the letter, failing which the application will not be considered for the preliminary stage.
414
  
Should a producer or an exporter fail to co-operate with the ITAC, it may request the imposition 
of a provisional payment within 200 days from the initiation, based on the facts available.
415
  
 
Where parties have co-operated the ITAC carries out the verification process, beginning with the 
importer and then the exporter, to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information 
submitted.
416
  From time to time, the verification process can be turned around, to begin with the 
exporter as was seen in the Sunset Review on Door Locks from China in 2007.
417
 A confidential 
verification report indicating all the confirmed information is issued to the specific party; 
meanwhile the non-confidential information is placed on the public file by the ITAC prior to its 
preliminary determination, and interested parties have seven days to respond to the report.
418
  
According to Brink, most of these verification reports are pointless in practice because they only 
indicate that certain sales and costs were verified without substantiating how the process was 
conducted or documents submitted.
419
  He cites the exporter verification letters on the public file 
of the Tyre (China) investigation, as an example of the meaninglessness of these verifications, 
adding that the reports for several different exporters in the same investigation will be the same 
save for the adjustments claimed.
420
  
 
The investigating officers make a submission to the Commissioners for the preliminary 
determination, where the directorate makes a decision on whether provisional payments should 
be imposed.
421
  If an affirmative preliminary finding is made by establishing that the dumping is 
causing material injury, the ITAC will make a request to the SARS to impose a provisional 
                                                             
413 See the ADR 31. 
414 See the ADR 31.2& 31.3. 
415 Board Report 4044 Garlic (China); See the ADR 32; 415 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 29 January 2013). 
416 See the ADR 18.1&2. 
417 ITAC Report No.247-Final determination of the Sunset Review of Anti-dumping on Door Locks and Handles 
Originating in or Imported from the People’s Republic of China ; Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping 
Action’ (2008) Lexis Nexis vol 5 266. 
418 See the ADR 19.1, 19.2&19.3. 
419 Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis Nexis vol 5 266. 
420Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 1March 2013). 
421 Brink G ‘A Nutshell Guide to Anti-dumping Action’ (2008) Lexis Nexis vol 5 266. 
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payment for six months amounting to the margin of dumping or the margin of injury, whichever 
is lower.
422
   
 
In the preliminary investigation of Brazilian chicken, the ITAC found that the South African 
Poultry Association, whose members were the domestic producers of whole chicken and 
boneless cuts, had experienced material injury caused by dumping, based on price undercutting, 
a decrease in market share, and growth.
423
  Supported by this finding, the SARS commissioner 
imposed provisional duties for 26 weeks which amounted to the dumping margin of 62.3per cent 
for whole chicken and 53.12 per cent for boneless cuts.
424
  The findings of the ITAC in Brazilian 
Chicken were different from those in the Paper Board Case despite there being injurious 
dumping and the ADR providing for provisional duties to be imposed if affirmative findings of 
dumping and material injury are found. The ITAC was of the opinion that the imposition of the 
provisional payments before verification would affect the downstream paper products industry. 
This case raised a lot of questions about the ITAC’s practice and decision, for not requesting the 
imposition of provisional payments despite injurious dumping being found and in spite of the 
downstream industry not having made any submissions. 
425
 
 
It should be noted that where the ITAC makes an affirmative preliminary determination, it can 
accept a price undertaking upon this finding and if such undertaking will eliminate injury to the 
domestic industry.
426
  It may refuse this undertaking where the exporters are too many or for 
general policy reasons.
427
  Up to this date the ITAC has not yet accepted a price undertaking. 
Conversely, if the ITAC makes a negative preliminary finding, it will publish a notice in the 
Government Gazette indicating that finding and issue a preliminary report to interested parties 
                                                             
422 See the ADR 33.2 & s57A of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. 
423 Viljoen W ‘Anti-dumping Duty on Chicken from Brazil’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/02/15/anti-
dumping-duty-on-chicken-from-brazil (accessed 12 April 2013). 
424 Viljoen W ‘Anti-dumping Duty on Chicken from Brazil’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/02/15/anti-
dumping-duty-on-chicken-from-brazil (accessed 12 April 2013). 
425 See ITAC Report 152: Investigation into the alleged dumping of paper and paperboard with a mass of 180g/m2 
or more, but not exceeding 550 g/m2, coated on one side with kaolin clay, commonly known as “white liner” or 
“grey backed paperboard”, originating in or imported from the Republic of Korea. 
426 See the ADR 39.1. 
427 See the ADR 39.3. 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 72  
 
within seven days after publication; however, it will not terminate the investigation.
428
 Due to the 
fact that the ITAC verifies questionnaire responses before preliminary, then the failure to 
terminate the investigation despite a negative finding is a violation of the WTO’s ADA, which 
requires the immediate termination of an investigation where there is a finding that there is a lack 
of sufficient grounds of either dumping or injury to continue with the investigation.
429
  
 
4.4.3 The final phase   
 
In Brenco, 
430
 the Board on Tariffs and Trade referred to this phase as the final stage where all 
parties are allowed to give their comments on a provisional report of the Board and submission 
of further evidence, either in writing or orally, is allowed. 
 
According to reg 35 of the ADR, all interested parties are granted 14 days from the date of the 
preliminary report being made available to comment in writing. An extension may be given to a 
party who makes a motivated request in writing to the ITAC at least seven days prior to the 
deadline for comments.
431
 Parties may not submit new information in normal circumstances; 
however, in certain circumstances the ITAC allows new information.
432
  For example, where 
parties that submitted deficient responses have addressed those deficiencies prior to the deadline 
for comment on the preliminary report.
433
  If new information is accepted by the ITAC, it will 
make verification before dealing with the essential facts determination.
434
 
 
The ITAC informs all interested parties of the essential facts to be considered and they have 
seven days to make comments with the possibility of an extension for good cause.
435
  The ITAC 
is further obliged to take into consideration all relevant comments in its final finding.
436
 The 
                                                             
135See the ADR 34.1; Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-
dumping-in-south-africa/  (accessed 1March 2013). 
429 See Art 5.8 of the ADA. 
430 Chairman v Brenco 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) 526I. 
431 See the ADR 35.2&35.3. 
432 See the ADR 35.4. 
433 See the ADR 35.5 & 35.1. 
434 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 4 March 2013). 
435 See the ADR 37.1, 37.2, 37.3. 
436 See the ADR 37.4. 
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investigating officers prepare a final submission to the directorate after receiving the comments 
on the essential facts which is the rationale for the final determination.
437
  A final determination 
is made to the Ministry of Trade and Industry through the office of the director general and the 
deputy minister, and which is in the form of a recommendation. If the Minister accepts the 
recommendation that definitive duties be imposed, he will request the Minister of Finance to 
impose those duties, and he then instructs the SARS to implement them.
438
  On the other hand, 
the accepted recommendation could be negative. In either event, once the final determination is 
made it must be published in the Government Gazette and the interested parties are issued with 
the final report by the ITAC. This will mean a termination of the investigation.
439
  The anti-
dumping duties will remain in force for a period not exceeding five years from the date of 
imposition or the last review.
440
 
 
4.5 REVIEWS 
 
Parties may utilise the various types of review provided, after following certain procedures, for a 
re-evaluation of anti-dumping duties. There are: interim reviews (changed circumstances), sunset 
reviews, anti-circumvention reviews, new shipper reviews, and judicial reviews, all of which 
must be initiated though the Government Gazette.
441
 
 
4.5.1 Interim reviews (changed circumstances) 
 
Any interested party may request this kind of review at least a year after the imposition of anti-
dumping duties and the publication thereof, to determine whether the duties can be decreased, 
increased or withdrawn.
442
 Initiation by the ITAC will only take place where the party can prove 
a significant change in circumstance, save for a party who did not co-operate during the original 
investigation and is now willing to co-operate.
443
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The process for an interim review is like that of an original investigation, only that there is no 
preliminary determination, and parties receive 14 days to make comments on the essential facts, 
rather than seven.
444
  The ITAC’s final determination as a recommendation to the minister may 
result in an increase, decrease, abandonment or continuation of the existing anti-dumping 
duty.
445
  Note worthy that in South Africa, since the ADR became law, only five interim reviews 
have been conducted.
446
 
 
4.5.2 Sunset reviews  
 
South Africa initiated its first sunset review in December 1999, a few days before the duties 
lapsed in terms of the ADA, and by 2007 it had conducted at least 64 sunset reviews of anti-
dumping duties.
447
   The domestic industry must request the initiation of a sunset review as this 
review is not self-initiative.
448
  Its purpose is to ensure that anti-dumping measures stay in place 
only as long as they are necessary to counter the injurious effects of dumping.
449
  In SA, 
definitive anti-dumping duties remain in place for a period of five years unless it is established 
that dumping and material injury will continue taking place if the duties lapse.
450
 If it happens 
that a sunset review has been initiated before the anti-dumping duty expires, such duty remains 
in force until the review has been finalised.
451
 
 
The ITAC had established an interpretation of the five year period to be counted from the day of 
the publication of the notice imposing the definitive measure (similar to the position in the USA, 
the EU and India).
452
  However, in September of 2007 the issues of interpretation of the five year 
period as well as anti-dumping duties applied retrospectively were dealt with in Progress office 
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machines v SARS
453
  and a finding different to that of the ITAC was made. The SCA held that 
since legislation provided that anti-dumping duties could not be imposed for more than five 
years, if duties were imposed with retrospective effect, the five years should be counted from the 
retrospective date of application of the duties and not from the date of publication of the notice 
imposing such duties.
454
  This meant that the maximum duration of anti-dumping duties was five 
years from the date of application and not from the date of imposition.  
 
The SCA‘s decision has been criticised as being erroneous, for two reasons, although it  cannot 
be appealed unless it is taken to the Constitutional Court on a constitutional ground.
455
  First, is 
the fact that the court in its interpretation of the legislation, disregarded that which was consistent 
with international law as required by s233 of the Constitution. Despite hearing that in the USA 
and the EU the five year period is determined in accordance with the ADA, the court still made 
its decision differently. Secondly, according to the ADR
456
 definitive duties remain in place for 
five years from the date of publication of the ITAC’s final determination; meaning that the five 
years are counted from the date the notice is published in spite of the duty being imposed with 
retrospective effect.
457
   This decision could have negative effects on the domestic industry, in 
the sense that all anti-dumping duties currently in place that follow earlier sunset reviews, would 
have to be revoked with retrospective effect, thereby denying the domestic industries protection 
against unfair trade.
458
 The ITAC now follows the SCA’s decision when initiating sunset 
reviews. 
 
How is a sunset review initiated? According to the ADR, the ITAC is required to publish a notice 
in the Government Gazette for each individual anti-dumping duty six months before it lapses.
459
  
                                                             
453 Progress Office Machines CC v South African Revenue Service and others (2007) SA 118 (SCA). 
454 Brink G ‘Sunset Reviews in South Africa: How Long is Five Years?’ TRALAC Trade Brief available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2008/05/21/sunset-reviews-in-south-africa-how-long-is -five years/ (accessed 10 April 2013). 
455 Brink G ‘Sunset Reviews in South Africa: How Long is Five Years?’ TRALAC Trade Brief available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2008/05/21/sunset-reviews-in-south-africa-how-long-is -five years/ (accessed 10 April 2013). 
456 See the ADR 38.1. 
457 Brink G ‘Sunset Reviews in South Africa: How Long is Five Years?’ TRALAC Trade Brief available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2008/05/21/sunset-reviews-in-south-africa-how-long-is -five years/ (accessed 10 April 2013). 
458 Brink G ‘Sunset Reviews in South Africa: How Long is Five Years?’ TRALAC Trade Brief available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2008/05/21/sunset-reviews-in-south-africa-how-long-is -five years/ (accessed 10 April 2013). 
459 See the ADR 54.1. 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 76  
 
In practice however, in May-June of each year the ITAC publishes a record of all anti-dumping 
duties that are due to expire the following year.
460
  This is a breach of the provisions of the ADR.  
 
After publication, the ITAC will directly inform interested parties, known from the original 
investigation, of the publication.
461
  The domestic industry has 30 days to indicate whether it will 
oppose the duties being withdrawn (request a sunset review). Such indication is followed by 
submission of a proper application with the necessary information to establish a factual case that 
the removal of the anti-dumping duty will lead to the recurrence of injurious dumping.
462
  On the 
other hand, if the industry does not give a response or if it indicates that the duties are not 
required, the anti-dumping duties will terminate on the date stated in the published notice.
463
 
 
Once the sunset review has been initiated the exporters have to submit all information in the 
required format to enable the ITAC to make a finding on dumping. Exporters, foreign producers 
and importers are not precluded from providing any other information they deem important.
464
 
The local industry may also be required to provide any information required by ITAC.
465
 If the 
ITAC makes a positive finding, that is, that both dumping and material injury will recur if the 
duty is removed, then the anti-dumping duty will stay in place, though it can be amended. Should 
the finding be negative, the duties will be withdrawn.
466
 
 
What happens in instances where after the imposition of anti-dumping duties the exporters or 
foreign producers stop exporting in the SACU market, leading to the absence of the export price 
and consequently an inability to establish if dumping is likely to recur? The absence of the export 
price means zero determination of dumping. In such cases the ITAC would require exporters to 
submit all export sales to all destinations, and then it uses that information to determine the 
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export price through a third country, or uses the average export price.
467
  This practice was 
however changed by the High Court’s decision in Carbon Black-Egypt Sunset Review where the  
 
ITAC’s methodology used to determine the likelihood of a recurrence of dumping was found to 
be flawed because it lacked rationality and the final determination had been made without 
considering relevant information.
468
  The court in this case further stated that the ITAC could not 
apply average dumping margins for exports to all countries but must investigate the countries 
into which exports were dumped so as to establish if the factors that led to dumping in those 
particular countries would also be present in the SACU.
469
  The effect of this decision on the 
domestic industries is the provision of better protection as the chances of the ITAC finding a 
continuing, or recurrence of, dumping if anti-dumping duties are removed, will be increased.
470
 
 
A sunset review should be concluded within 12 months after the initiation of the review.
471
  The 
ITAC can take more time than stipulated and because of that it has been criticised for not 
adhering to the timing and procedure, as was seen in ITAC v SCAW South Africa (pty) ltd
472
 
where the ITAC finalised the case 17 months later (524 days) in spite of the WTO requiring a 
year.
473
  Despite time being a very important factor in an anti-dumping case, the ITAC takes very 
long to finalise its investigations, the longest in comparison with other major anti-dumping users: 
Australia and New Zealand take less than 180 days.
474
  In the same case, the Constitutional Court 
held that the High Court had erred in its decision to allow the imposition of a temporary interdict 
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which stopped sunset reviews from being completed, and in addition led to the anti-dumping 
duties imposed by the ITAC to remain in force until a judicial review had been completed 
regardless of how long it took.
475
  The Constitutional Court added in its finding that the 
extension of the duration of anti-dumping duties was inappropriate and against international and 
domestic law, and that if the practice was allowed, interested parties would suffer and trade 
relations would be damaged.
476
 
 
4.5.3 Anti-circumvention reviews 
 
Due to the fact that anti-dumping measures are becoming more popular, methods to circumvent 
them are also increasing. Circumvention generally means ‘an attempt by parties subject to anti-
dumping duties to avoid paying the duties by “formally” moving outside the range of the anti-
dumping duties order while “substantially” engaging in the same commercial activities as 
before’.477  It is not always an easy task to distinguish circumvention from a company shifting 
operations for legitimate reasons, for example, where a company transfers its production to the 
export market because costs are lower, even though the transfer involves products that were 
subject to an anti-dumping duty. Failure of a proper distinction could have adverse effects on 
investment and could lead to trade being distorted.
478
  The EU and the USA were the first to 
enact legislative provisions to prevent circumvention since they considered any behaviour of 
circumventing an anti-dumping duty as transformed dumping, and that it weakened the 
corrective effect of the anti-dumping duty in the importing country.
 479
  Meanwhile Japan, which 
was the first to be subject to an anti-circumvention duty by the EU, together with Korea, saw the 
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measure as an example of trade protectionism and distortion.
 480
  Due to these differences in 
points of view during the Uruguay Round, an agreement with reference to circumvention could 
not be reached, and in the Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, the ministers acknowledged that 
fact. As a result the WTO’s ADA does not provide for such measures and countries have 
unilaterally adopted their own anti-circumvention provisions.
481
   
 
In South Africa anti-circumvention rules are provided for in the ADR, with only four reviews 
being conducted since these came into force.
482
 According to the ADR, circumvention is defined 
as  
 
a) ‘a change in the pattern of trade between third countries and South Africa or the Common 
Customs area of the Southern African Customs Union; 
i) which results from a practice, process or work; 
ii) for which there is no or insufficient cause or economic justification other than the 
imposition of the anti-dumping duty; 
b) remedial effects of the anti-dumping measure are being undermined in terms of the volumes 
or prices of the products under investigation; 
c) dumping can be found in relation to normal values previously established for the like or 
similar products’.483   
 
The ADR differentiates between the various types of circumventions: minor modifications of the 
product, assembly operations in a third country or within the SACU, absorbing the duty, country 
hopping, and declaring products under a different tariff. 
484
  A domestic industry may request an 
anti-circumvention review in respect of any or all of these activities by the exporter for the 
purposes of circumventing the duty. This particular review contains a unique provision in that, 
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unlike the case in all the other reviews, the domestic industry is not required to submit new 
injury or dumping information if it makes an application within a year of the publication of the 
final determination in the original case.
485
  If the ITAC finds that circumvention has taken place, 
three recommendations may be made: increasing anti-dumping duties to compensate for 
absorbing duties; extending the scope of the duties to apply to parts, components or substitute 
like products; and lastly, ‘extending  anti-dumping duties at the required level to the supplier in 
the country from which the product is exported subsequent to the imposition of  the original 
provisional payments or anti-dumping duties or the initiation of the original investigation, 
including to parts, components or substitute like products, new models and the like’.486 
 
In the light of the failure of the Ministers in the Uruguay round to reach a multilateral agreement 
to deal with circumvention, what can be implied from the South African rules relating to anti-
circumvention? These rules are inconsistent with the WTO’s ADA for two reasons: first, there is 
no provision that allows Members to impose the circumvention and anti-circumvention measures 
or duties on products which have not been fully investigated and found to have been dumped and 
causing injury.
487
 In terms of Art18.1 of the ADA, Members are forbidden from taking any 
action against dumping unless they act according to the Agreement, in which case SA is not 
complying with this requirement because it is acting outside what the ADA provides. In addition, 
since an anti-circumvention action amounts to imposing a duty without investigating injury and 
dumping, this is not in line with Art VI of the GATT 1994 which provides that for anti-dumping 
duties to be imposed a finding of injury and dumping with respect to a like product from the 
exporting country must be made. The findings in anti-circumvention measures do not represent 
the required standard for determining dumping required by the WTO.
488
 Therefore, could anti-
circumvention laws be said to be the result of an independent adaptation, by countries, like South 
Africa, and not founded on the ADA? 
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Secondly, the duty violates the principle of national treatment with respect to internal taxation 
and regulation.
489
  For example, as a form of circumventing, the foreign producers export ‘like 
products’ which are to be assembled in the SACU market, and as a consequence anti-
circumvention measures are applied to expand the scope of an existing anti-dumping duty to 
include the like product which is being assembled in the importing Members territory, then this 
is a violation of the national treatment principle. Art III (2) of the GATT stipulates that products 
of any Member imported into the territory of another Member shall not be subject directly or 
indirectly to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied 
directly or indirectly to like domestic products, so as to afford protection to domestic products. 
These were also the findings of the GATT Panel in the case of the EU imposing anti-
circumvention duties on Japanese parts and components.
490
 The Panel held that the anti-
circumvention duty on products assembled within the EU by Japanese companies was neither 
supposed to be an import tax but a domestic tax, nor was it supposed to be discriminatory, being 
only imposed on those companies. The unfair internal tax was a violation of Art III (2) - national 
treatment with respect to domestic taxation.
491
                                                        
 
4.5.4 New shipper reviews 
 
A foreign producer who did not export to the SACU market during the original investigation and 
whose country has been subjected to anti-dumping duties may want to export its products to 
South Africa with an individual duty rate. According to reg 48, he is entitled to request a new 
shipper review. Definitive anti-dumping duties have to be imposed before the ITAC can consider 
a request for a new shipper review.
492
 The exporter bears the burden of providing satisfactory 
information that proves that his company is not and was not related to any other party that had 
earlier on exported to, and had duties applied by, South Africa.
493
  In addition, he has to submit 
information relating to normal value and export price to show that no dumping will take place, or 
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that the margin of dumping will be lower in comparison to the duty in place.
494
  The exporter’s 
margin of dumping will be established as the difference between the export price to SA and 
normal value, with the new shipper’s export price to a third country being used where an export 
price to SA cannot be determined.
495
  If dumping is found to exist, the ITAC will not 
acknowledge an application indicating a lesser dumping rate than the anti-dumping duty level in 
place, and will maintain the existing duty.
496
  
 
If the ITAC accepts the exporter’s application, it will request the SARS Commissioner through 
the Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister of Finance to impose a provisional payment that 
remains in force pending the review’s finalisation, and to withdraw the anti-dumping duties that 
were imposed on the exporter.
497
  The reason for the provisional payment is to ensure that if 
dumping is found and a definitive duty is imposed, it can be applied with retrospective effect to 
the date of withdrawing the duty. 
498
  
 
4.5.5 Judicial reviews 
  
If a person is affected by a decision made by the ITAC, he may apply to a High Court for a 
review, and the court may make an order for payment of costs against a party or any other person 
who represents a party, in accordance with the law and fairness.
499
   In addition to the ITAA, the 
interested party has a right to have the decision reviewed under the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA)
500
 on the basis that a decision made in terms of the ADR is an administrative 
action, in which the aggrieved party is entitled to a lawful, reasonable and fair procedure.
501
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In South Africa there is no difference between the judicial review of trade remedies, which 
include anti-dumping, and that of other government actions.
502
 The High Court has jurisdiction 
over all legal actions with the Small Claims Courts dealing with minor matters. If a party is 
granted leave to appeal a High Court decision, it may do so in the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
However, all constitutional matters are heard in the Constitutional Court. The High Court sitting 
in Pretoria is where all the ITAC decisions are lodged as that is where it is situated.
503
 The anti-
dumping judicial reviews are conducted under South African domestic law, viz, the ITAA, the 
ADR, and Chapter VI of the Customs and Excise Act.
504
  However, it should be noted that s231 
and s233 of the Constitution require courts to interpret national legislation in line with 
international law. 
 
The ITAC’s preliminary decisions, procedures and final determinations may be taken on review 
if it can be shown that the ITAC has violated the ITAA or the ADR, its conduct has caused 
serious prejudice to the aggrieved party and the prejudice cannot be undone by the ITAC’s final 
determination.
505
  Any interested party must give the ITAC at least 30 days notice prior to filing 
any judicial review.
506
  Any decision made by the ITAC may be varied to give effect to the 
ruling of a dispute panel or appellate body under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, 
provided the affected interested parties are consulted with respect to any proposed variations.
507
 
Judicial review in South Africa tends to be very expensive  as regards to legal fees, with the costs 
to the applicants and the ITAC each exceeding US$ 500 000 (R4 900 000-with an exchange rate 
of Rand 9.8=1$), although there are no court fees except  for a diminutive stamp duty.
508
 
Generally only a few cases have been subjected to judicial review, with all except Ranbaxy
509
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being lodged by the domestic industry. Apart from the cost issue, there is also the problem of 
access to relevant information in comparison to the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
510 
 
 
4.6 WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROBLEMS GENERALLY WITH THE ANTI-DUMPING 
TOOL IN SA?  
 
Although some inconsistencies and problems specific to the South African anti-dumping laws 
have been highlighted in the discussion above, it is helpful to give a brief overview of those and 
other difficulties. They are classified as procedural issues, substantive issues, and others. This is 
a general view and not a closed list as there could be other problems which are not discussed in 
this thesis. 
 
4.6.1 Procedural issues 
 
Various procedural concerns have been raised over the manner in which investigations are 
initiated and conducted by the agency responsible to carry out anti-dumping investigations in 
South Africa (the ITAC), and how it establishes contact with interested parties during an 
investigation. One case in particular is the recent Brazilian Chicken case, where provisional 
duties were imposed on Brazil’s imported whole and bone cuts chicken, following a finding of 
dumping and material injury to the SACU industry. The Brazilian Poultry Association was not 
content with the ITAC’s decision and indicated that it would request its Government to approach 
the WTO concerning the decision to impose anti-dumping duties.
511
  According to the 
Association, the ITAC findings were flawed, they violated the international organisation’s rules 
on anti-dumping, and they had various technical defects.
512
  It based its claims on the fact that 
the ITAC disregarded the information provided by three of the four Brazilian firms included in 
the agency’s inquiry and deemed the companies unco-operative. In addition six of the eight 
importers were deemed to have provided deficient information, as stated by the ITAC, and thus 
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Members-South Africa, A Complicated, Unpredictable, Long and Costly Judicial Review System (2013) 266. 
511 USDA ‘South Africa Sets Anti-dumping Duties’ available at http://www.worldpoultry.net/Broilers/Markets--
Trade/2012/3/South-Africa-sets-anti-dumping-duties-WP010128W/ (accessed 13 April 2013). 
512 Viljoen W ‘Anti-dumping Duty on Chicken from Brazil’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/02/15/anti-
dumping-duty-on-chicken-from-brazil (accessed 13 April 2013). 
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not considered.
513
 This was a breach of the evidentiary requirement found in Art 6.2 of the ADA, 
which states that throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have full 
opportunity for the defence of their interests. In Guatemala-Cement II and Egypt-Steel Rabar, 
respectively, the WTO Panel interpreted the above provision as being a ‘fundamental due 
process provision’ and that it created an obligation on the investigating authorities to provide 
interested parties with opportunities to defend their interests.
514
  The question therefore arises, 
whether South Africa provided enough opportunities to the Brazilian companies to be said to 
have respected this process? 
 
The same concerns were also raised by the Association of Meat Importers and Exporters (AMIE) 
before South Africa’s Parliamentary Committee on Trade and Industry, in connection with its 
experience with the ITAC’s investigation into the alleged dumping of poultry from Brazil.515 It 
raised the irregularities on the ITAC’s part in observing and implementing its internal processes 
in accordance with both domestic and international legal obligations. For that reason it felt that 
the ITAC’s conduct had led to a decline in the quality of the reports issued.516  The height of 
inconsistency was finally reached when the ITAC published a notice in the Government Gazette 
on its decision not to impose definitive duties on Brazilian chicken, meaning that the interim 
duties had to terminate.
517
  This was despite its recommendation to the Trade and Industry 
Minister, Rob Davies, that the duties should be imposed. The manner in which the ITAC 
conducted itself, according to Cronjé, questions the agency’s capacity to execute its legislative 
directive. He adds that how the ITAC conducts itself will affect South Africa’s honour as a 
trading partner, and the failure to harmonise itself with its domestic and international obligations 
will lead to an increase in the disputes against it in the WTO.
518
   
                                                             
513 European Lawyers ‘Brazilian Poultry Exporters Challenge South African Anti-dumping Measures’ (2012) 
Fratini Vergano issue No 4  3. 
514 European Lawyers ‘Brazilian poultry Exporters Challenge South African Anti-dumping Measures’ (2012) Fratini 
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515Cronjé JB ‘Concerns over ITAC Trade Remedy Investigations’ available at 
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516Cronjé JB ‘Concerns over ITAC Trade Remedy Investigations’ available at 
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continues/ (accessed 14 April 2013). 
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The AMIE’s advocate agreed with Cronjé, saying that the ITAC lacked transparency and called 
its reports ‘scant and deficient’.519 
 
Non-disclosure of confidential information:
520
  The ITAA states that any interested party may 
claim confidentiality, supported by reasons for such a claim and a ‘written abstract’ of the 
information in a non-confidential form.
521
 Information which is confidential by its nature is 
distinguished from information otherwise claimed to be confidential.
522
  Although the ITAC is 
required to make a determination from the information with which it is provided, whether or not 
the information is in the real sense confidential, in practice the ITAC treats too much information 
as confidential, and as a consequence interested parties are not in a position to defend themselves 
adequately. An example is the case of Rhône Poulenc
523
 where the High Court ruled that the 
applicant should have been supplied with more information by the ITAC, to enable it to be in a 
position to know all the complexities of the case against it. The solution, according to Horlick 
and Vermulst, would be to shift the system of disclosure of confidential information under an 
administrative protective order, as occurs in Canada and the USA, which is more effective, 
despite it being complex and costly or to make a list of all the information that ought not to be 
treated as confidential.
524
 
 
The ITAC fail to disclose the essential facts that they consider which form the basis of making a 
decision whether to apply definitive measures as is provided for in reg 37. This process is 
deemed to be insufficient by interested parties, considering that this is their chance to comment 
on the decisions and findings of the investigating authorities before the final determination is 
made.
525
 Another issue is that the judicial review process which is used by interested parties, 
who are not satisfied with the ITAC’s determination, ceases to have meaning in South Africa. 
                                                             
519Ensor L ‘ITAC Defends Itself over Handling of Chicken Dumping’ ’ Business Day BD-live 29 November 2012 
15. 
520 Vermulst E & Horlick G ‘10 Major Problems with the AD instrument: An Attempt at Synthesis’ Journal of 
World Trade (2005) 39(1) 67-73. 
521 See s33 of the ITA Act. 
522 See s33(1) of the ITA Act. 
523 Rhône Poulenc v Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade 1998/6589 (T). 
524 Vermulst E & Horlick G ‘10 Major Problems with the AD Instrument: An Attempt at Synthesis’ Journal of 
World Trade (2005) 39(1) 67-73. 
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The local courts are reluctant to double-check the ITAC’s decisions and the process, if done, is 
very slow.
526
  Brink concurs with this point as he says that most decisions against the ITAC have 
been sent back to it for reconsideration, yet the courts do not need to refer the matter back to the 
ITAC as they are required by the Constitution to make an order that is just an equitable.
527
 
 
Lastly, the circumvention and anti-circumvention provisions provided for in the ADR are 
inconsistent with the WTO ADA, and this is a problem. There are no rules or a multilateral 
agreement dealing with circumvention. If there is no permission given to Members to apply this 
measure, is that not a contravention in itself? Art 1 of the ADA clearly forbids a Member from 
taking action against another Member that is dumping, if it is in conflict with the ADA. The 
situation would be different if all Members had uniform rules on circumvention, provided for by 
the WTO. 
 
4.6.2 Substantive issues 
 
There are problems with respect to constructed normal values as a basis for determining normal 
value when they cannot be based on the domestic sales. In SA this construction is deemed to be 
too artificial and discretionary
528
  based on the fact that it gives negative or very low dumping 
margins and the ITAC reports do not contain details on how these constructed values were 
arrived at. In turn, this makes it very hard to know which sub-provisions of the ADR were 
used.
529
   As was stated above in 4.3.3, when establishing fair comparison, the ITAC fails to take 
into consideration all the necessary factors to assist in the making of proper adjustments. This is 
one of the major concerns Brazil intended to raise at the WTO in its case against South Africa’s 
imposition of anti-dumping duties on its chicken. It complained that the ITAC when comparing 
prices did not take into account the 16.5 per cent tax rate on poultry in the domestic Brazilian 
                                                             
526 Vermulst E & Horlick G ‘10 Major Problems with the AD Instrument: An Attempt at Synthesis’ Journal of 
World Trade (2005) 39(1) 67-73. 
527 Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2012/07/25/anti-dumping-in-south-
africa/  (accessed 23 March 2013). 
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market, although the exported product is not taxed.
530
  Both Art 2.4 of the ADA and s32 (3) of 
the ITAA require the investigating officers to make due allowance for factors affecting price 
comparability between the export price and the normal value.  These factors are: differences in 
the conditions and terms of sale, differences in taxation, and other differences affecting price 
comparability.
531
 The factor in this case was the different levels of taxation. In US-Lumber V, the 
WTO Panel was also in agreement with the provisions above when it held that investigating 
authorities must make price adjustments in cases where differences have been shown to affect 
price comparability.
532
 
 
4.6.3 Other issues 
 
The South African data set is made up of incomplete or missing data. It lacks dates when the 
preliminary anti-dumping duties came into effect, and when the anti-dumping measures were 
revoked (where applicable), and both preliminary and final outcomes as well as hard copies of 
some HS codes are missing. Information relating to some industries is also said to be left out in 
the government reports.
533
  The ITAC was accused of using incorrect statistics in Brazil Chicken 
which amounted to misrepresentation. The claims of huge volumes of imported poultry products 
and injury suffered by the local industry were untrue, based on the statistics given.
534
  It is 
alleged that the real figures of the whole and bone cuts, from Brazil, as a percentage of domestic 
consumption was 1.5 in 2011.The ITAC ignored all communication from the Brazilian industry 
as well as its Government concerning the wrong and incomplete information which it used in 
coming to its conclusions.
535
 This conduct could shake confidence in the system as 
accountability would be difficult without the correct data to substantiate the decisions made. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa is an established user of anti-dumping provisions whose laws have gone through a 
process of transition since 1914. The enactment of the ITAA and the ADR has made SA’s anti-
dumping laws and procedures more clear and reliable. The success of its anti-dumping 
experience in the African continent has clearly shown other WTO Members that national anti-
dumping laws should resemble those of Art VI. 
 
That has not been the only lesson; there are also some problems and inconsistencies with the 
ADA and the ADR that have been highlighted. More often than not, what is provided for in the 
law is not what is put into practice. Kenya’s policy makers should not only pay attention to the 
positives of this regime, but also keep the negatives in mind in the formation of their own anti-
dumping instrument. Thus they can avoid making the same mistakes and in the end use this tool 
for the right reasons and not merely as a protective measure for Kenya’s local industries.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
 
In the Middle Ages the term ‘dumping’ was used to mean the act of discarding something 
unwanted, but at the beginning of the 20
th
 century it began being used in international trade. It 
was then used to illustrate the behaviour of producers of one country that sold goods in another 
country at exceptionally low prices.
536
  The WTO rules govern the use of anti-dumping measures 
by national authorities; nonetheless there are differences in countries’ readiness to use these 
duties, in their procedures, and their rules. As a result of these variations some countries are able 
to protect their industries to a greater extent than others.
537
   Even so, since the adoption of the 
first anti-dumping law in 1904, it cannot be said that there exists a national anti-dumping law 
that is impeccable. This thesis examined the WTO’s ADA which sets the standard for Members 
that wish to impose anti-dumping measures as well as the national anti-dumping legal and 
institutional frameworks of Kenya and South Africa. The goal of this mini-thesis was to examine 
what is internationally required in an anti-dumping inquiry as well as provide an insight into the 
municipal laws and institutions of South Africa which are considered as experienced and 
effective, and which serve as a good example of an African developing country that has 
succeeded by adhering to the WTO rules. The reality is that Kenya’s agricultural sub sectors 
have continuously been affected by dumping and its current municipal laws are too weak to 
adequately provide relief. This situation can be remedied by use of an effective anti-dumping 
discipline, which prompted the Kenyan government into making the decision to amend its 
current laws.  
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An examination of how South Africa has dealt with this unfair practice serves as a motivator and 
provides lessons for Kenya as it endeavours to amend its anti-dumping laws in order to achieve 
compliance with the WTO requirements and consequently fulfil its international obligations. 
Furthermore, from the said experience it is apparent that these laws should be as simple as 
possible and mirror those of the ADA. 
 
The research identified that if a country decides to have an anti-dumping system that will 
successfully protect its domestic industries from injury caused by dumping, WTO consistency is 
paramount not only in the making of the law but also in its actual implementation. The purpose 
of this last chapter is therefore to discuss some suitable suggestions to ensure that Kenya 
achieves total compliance and at the same time be in a position to stimulate economic 
development. Furthermore, with regard to some challenging issues of the SA anti-dumping rules 
highlighted in Chapter 4, some suggestions will also be made for South Africa. 
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KENYA 
 
With the creation and effective coming into law of Kenya’s anti-dumping laws, it will be 
amongst other new developing countries that have implemented the anti-dumping laws, and 
eventually a new user thereof in the international dumping field. However, to create and impose 
the anti-dumping remedy Kenya must ensure that it has a strategy to achieve this purpose, which 
includes the following: 
 
5.2.1 Existence of a national legislative framework  
 
This is one of the basic requirements for an anti-dumping action. For the local producers to be in 
a position to file for protection there must be comprehensive national laws setting out the 
conditions and the process.
538
  Without this framework it would be impossible to carry out an 
investigation to determine the effects of dumping. In accordance with the ADA, Members will 
only apply anti-dumping measures under the provisions of Art VI of the GATT 1994, and only 
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after investigations are initiated and carried out in accordance to the requirements of the ADA.
539
  
Therefore, as the ADA provides, the Kenyan municipal law should establish exhaustive rules to 
determine dumping (calculation of normal values and export prices, adjustments to make normal 
values and export prices comparable, and calculation of the dumping margin) as well as a 
standard to determine that dumped imports cause injury to the local industry.
540
   
 
An administrative procedure must also be created which will be followed at the commencement 
and during the conduct of the investigations. Time periods must also be set within which to carry 
out the investigation and for the implementation and duration of these measures.
541
  Kenya is 
advised to use the ADA as a model and also look at other countries’ systems, like that of South 
Africa, when drafting its own provisions. Input into the drafting of the legislation from experts, 
such as, lawyers and academics, both local and foreign, will be of great importance. For 
example, when South Africa was drafting its anti-dumping regulations it requested contributions 
and support from several lawyers from Canada, the USA and New Zealand in addition to those 
from the Republic.
542
  Furthermore, in the creation of the legislation and before its adoption it 
would be advisable to have proper consultations between the government and private 
stakeholders from various sectors, and a free flow of information between them to ensure that all 
issues concerning them are addressed. Joubert states that the dialogue between the stakeholders 
should focus on issues that will affect the whole country and its economy rather than only on 
micro-issues. He points out that South Africa put a number of frameworks in place during the 
process of enacting its anti-dumping law: for example the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC), the primary vehicle for social discussions and negotiation between 
the government, business and community organisations and trade unions on issues of social, 
development and economic policies;
543
 and public hearings. 
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He adds that the establishment of such an opportunity was important as all spheres of society 
were involved in the decision making process since policy making cannot be achieved in 
vacuum.
544
  
 
As Kenya is in the process of amending its laws, it is important for the legislators to keep in 
mind the reasons for the development of its anti-dumping system. Besides international price 
discrimination, the welfare of its people is also paramount. This concern includes consumers and 
industrial users. Thus, some issues which may affect their interests and influence the 
investigating authorities in the imposition of anti-dumping measures should be dealt with. These 
are matters relating to big policy questions, such as, the lesser duty rule and the public interest 
rule, which are substantive provisions found in the ADA, and are discretionary in their 
application by Members. This thesis supports the idea of including mandatory public interest and 
lesser duty clauses in the Kenyan national anti-dumping laws. 
 
5.2.1.1 Public interest rule:  
At the outset, one needs to consider this question: is the application of an anti-dumping measure 
always in the best interests of the consumers, domestic producers and importers who use an 
imported product as an input for their products? What happens if it is not? Some countries apply 
a public interest test before imposing anti-dumping measures. An example is Canada which has 
adopted a public interest clause and has a very detailed legal framework and practice on this 
issue. In its infamous Baby Food case the Canadian International Trade Tribunal made a 
recommendation to the Minister of Finance to reduce the duty by two-thirds so as to mitigate the 
consequences for low income families and concerns over child health and welfare.
545
 On the 
contrary, South Africa has drafted public interest provisions but promulgation has not yet taken 
place. During the Uruguay and the Doha Rounds WTO Members tried to negotiate a mandatory 
public interest clause in the ADA but failed to do so.  
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Thus, currently under the ADA there is neither an obligation on authorities to take public interest 
into account nor a prohibition of its consideration during an investigation.
546
  The public interest 
clause generally means that before the anti-dumping measure is imposed, due consideration is 
given to its impact on groups other than the domestic producers in the society and the country as 
a whole. Some authors argue against this clause stating that it would add to the uncertainty of the 
proceedings and administrative difficulties, and would result in an increase in the costs of 
investigation both to the government and the parties.
547
  Krishna concurs with regard to the cost 
factor, and adds that it is also time consuming.
548
  Notwithstanding the opposition, this thesis 
addresses the rationale for proposing a mandatory public interest clause in Kenya’s anti-dumping 
laws. An anti-dumping law’s purpose is to protect the domestic industry from injury caused by 
imports of dumped goods. However, even though a local industry is harmed by alleged dumped 
imports, other parties benefit from them, such as, downstream import-using industries and 
consumers, thereby causing a conflict of interest to arise between the latter and the former. An 
anti-dumping law without a public interest clause falls short in not taking into account these 
conflicting interests.
 549
  If a positive finding of dumping and injury is made, the anti-dumping 
remedies for the local producers follow automatically without considering the consequences for 
other parties. This is not reasonable policy making. A public interest provision in a national anti-
dumping regime could therefore serve as a means of access to socio-economic justice for 
adversely affected parties, and as a way of balancing producer interest with that of the 
consumer.
550
   
 
 In addition, anti-dumping practices may have undesirable effects on the national economy and 
impose a number of costs on the domestic economy by affecting the importing country’s price 
structure and creating difficulty for industries to obtain the supplies needed. The aim of the 
public interest clause in such a case is to ensure that investigating officers consider anti-dumping 
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547 Banks G The Anti-dumping Experience of a GATT- Fearing Country (1993) 46. 
548 Krishna R ‘Anti-dumping in Law and Practice’ Policy Research Working Paper available at 
http://books.google.com/books/.../Antidumping_in_Law_and_Practice.htm  (accessed 7 May 2013). 
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complaints in a wider context, taking into account the interests of the domestic industries as well 
as the costs of the anti-dumping interventions to the national economy. Lastly, adding a public 
interest clause will impose due restraint in the application of the anti-dumping measures. These 
restrictions are important because the impact of the measures is likely to spread with increases in 
trade volume and direct investment, particularly in developing countries. For that reason, 
increasing the power of multiple stakeholders to affect the outcome of anti-dumping proceedings 
may lead to some discipline over the application of these laws.
551
 In view of the above, it would 
be wise for Kenya’s domestic anti-dumping law to oblige the investigating officials to evaluate 
whether the application of the duties is in the interests of the public. 
 
5.2.1.2 Lesser duty rule:  
 
The ADA provides that the decision whether, or not to impose an anti-dumping  duty even if all 
the requirements for dumping and injury have been met, as well as regards the amount thereof, is 
to be made by the investigating authorities of the importing country. It however adds that it is 
desirable that the imposition of the duty be less than the margin if such duty would be sufficient 
to remove the injury caused to the local industry.
552
 The ADA uses the word ‘desirable’, which 
means that its application is optional for Members, and not words like ‘must’ and ‘shall’. The EU 
and South Africa, as was seen in the previous Chapter, have made the application of the lesser 
duty rule mandatory. The rule is often referred to as the soft option to ensure public interest 
because to some extent it eases the harm caused to consumers by the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties. By applying this rule, the downstream parties negatively affected by these measures gain 
from the lesser duty because it lessens the burden of any price increase borne by the market 
participants.
553
 Although the public interest rule tackles a wider range of public interest matters, 
the lesser duty rule is also important because in some way it partially reduces the negative results 
of anti-dumping measures.  
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Hence, Kenya would be advised to simultaneously apply both the lesser duty rule and the public 
interest clause, because such an approach portrays its seriousness to secure public interest 
concerns while applying its anti-dumping tool.
554
 
 
5.2.2 Existence of an institutional structure and setting up investigating authorities 
 
Who will the interested parties go to if they want to file an allegation of dumping and where will 
they go in search of a remedy? The Kenyan government should ensure that an institutional body 
responsible for managing anti-dumping cases is put in place. The only two countries in Africa 
with fully-fledged institutions are South Africa and Egypt.
555
  South Africa has the ITAC which 
is the agency in charge of carrying out investigations in the Republic and on behalf of SACU. 
The organisation will be a juristic person. Investigating officers must be trained. Kenya, in 
comparison to South Africa has not had many industrial sectors and sub-sectors being affected 
by dumping, thereby necessitating frequent use of the anti-dumping tool. For that reason, this 
research would recommend a special group of investigators who would be employed only when 
a case is filed or when necessary, rather than a permanent team; this will also save costs and 
resources. This is the same approach adopted by Mauritius.
556
   According to Vermulst, because 
developing countries lack expertise and manpower, their application of anti-dumping laws is 
hindered.
557
 Anti-dumping investigations involve several different areas of professional activity; 
therefore people from different fields will be required. At least, for daily administration, these 
disciplines, among others, should be represented: law, economics and accountancy.
558
  South 
Africa’s ITAC requires its Commissioners to have qualified in economics, accounting, law, 
commerce, agriculture and industry or public affairs.
559
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Arrangements should also be made with regards to the housing and maintaining of the 
investigating officers and their directors. This includes the offices where they will be situated, 
stationery and equipment, salaries and wages etc.  
 
Similar to the involvement in the drafting of the legislation, while carrying out their duties it 
would be wise for the authorities to involve the private sector in decision making to ensure that 
the anti-dumping mechanism is not entirely government controlled. This ensures that fairness, 
honesty and reasonableness are applied. As in many other African countries, political corruption 
is a problem in Kenya, which hinders the administration and enforcement of various laws. For 
example, in the sugar sub-sector, one of its problems with respect to dumping is contributed by 
corrupt custom officials who allow powerful personalities in the government to import sugar 
duty-free and sell it at a cheaper price than the locally produced product.
560
 Those government 
officials are neither reported nor prosecuted. But, are the revenue authorities not under 
government control? Adding the responsibility of overseeing the application of this trade remedy 
to the same custom officials who violate simple custom rules will be a disaster, the more so if 
they continue being solely in charge.
561
 An institution which is privately and publicly co-
ordinated will be of great relevance to ensure the proper enforcement of the national anti-
dumping law. 
 
Lastly, an independent judiciary or tribunal is a paramount requirement, and it should be ensured 
that it not only exists, but also functions well enough to be in a position to hear and adjudicate 
dumping matters freely and fairly. Parties who are not satisfied with the findings of, or the 
procedure followed by, the investigating authorities should have an opportunity to appeal to a 
court of law. As required by the ADA, each Member whose national legislation contains anti-
dumping provisions shall maintain judicial or administrative procedures for review purposes. 
Moreover, these procedures should be independent of the investigating officials in charge of the 
determination or review in question.
562
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5.2.3 Secure financial and legal resources 
 
Resources will be required for the legislative process, training and maintaining the investigating 
officials and other members of staff, as well as the entire process of carrying out investigations 
either on the spot or through the best information available. Since an anti-dumping case involves 
a trial, legal resources should also be provided for. These include institutional, financial and 
human capacity. Cases can require fees in hundreds, thousands or millions of dollars although in 
developing countries the figures are much lower, maybe in the thousands.
563
 Putting in place an 
anti-dumping regime can be very expensive and sometimes the government simply cannot afford 
it. Therefore, Kenya is advised to seek technical assistance to establish this instrument. The 
WTO secretariat provides technical assistance to developing countries, mainly by building the 
necessary institutions and training of different kinds so that they can operate successfully in the 
multilateral trading system. The training sessions include seminars and workshops held in the 
Member countries or in Geneva. Funding for the training comes from the WTO’s budget, 
voluntary contributions from other Members, cost sharing either by countries involved or with an 
international organisation.
564
 The World Bank Group is also another source of financial and 
technical assistance to developing countries for projects involving, amongst others, trade, 
development and agriculture.
565
 
 
5.2.4 Creating awareness  
 
Government officials and their departments
566
 are not the only ones who need the knowledge and 
understanding of substantive and procedural aspects of anti-dumping: local industries (public and 
privately owned) should also be included. Local producers have to be made aware and have a 
good knowledge of the law and the process involved in filing a case. It would be wise for the 
legislation to be adopted with a plan to create awareness amongst the business community and 
the public on anti-dumping laws and procedures.  
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Kenya can follow what Mauritius has done by including and implementing a capacity building 
programme for the private and public institutions in its anti-dumping system.
567
 
 
5.2.5 Political and economic factors 
 
More often than not a framework which acts as a policy tool that can be relied on is considered 
as the most important factor. However, this is not always true based on the idea that it is 
pointless to have a rule that cannot be implemented. Therefore, implementation of the new laws 
will be equally as important. Political and economic factors generally limit many countries in the 
use of policies including anti-dumping. Since countries rely on each other in more than one way, 
this could potentially influence their decision to apply a trade remedy action against their trading 
partners, particularly if they are dependent on them in terms of investment, aid or export.
568
  
 
The Egyptian case depicts a country like Kenya being reluctant to use any measures, including 
the COMESA trade remedies, to protect its wheat industry against Egypt’s cheap imports. Before 
this incident, Kenya had imposed tariffs on Egyptian rice, resulting in a vengeful act by Egypt 
removing Kenyan tea from its list of preferential goods and the imposition of a 35 per cent 
import tariff.
569
  It seems that it was difficult for Kenya to do anything that would affect its links 
with Egypt and put its number one export destination for Kenyan tea in jeopardy. Being in such a 
tight spot is not easy; however Kenya has to find ways to solve this predicament by standing firm 
and perhaps finding a middle ground by negotiating.  
 
Truth is, in International trade countries will always depend on each other, and it is important to 
look at issues in a broader perspective (trade relations) rather than one-sidedly. In addition, it 
should be remembered that anti-dumping measures seek to protect local industries of the 
importing country and not to punish the act of dumping. An anti-dumping duty more often than 
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not reduces the number of, or drives away, exporters as a result of high duties.
 570
  Therefore, a 
price undertaking would be a way to deal with this issue instead of duties because it has a greater 
chance of still keeping the exporters coming into the market as well as maintaining a balance in 
the relations between Members. The dumping companies can on their own offer price 
undertakings or the importing country authorities may suggest them. The firms agree to either 
raise their prices or stop exporting at dumped prices and in return duties will not be imposed.
 571
 
 
5.2.6 Alternatives to the anti-dumping laws: intra- regional rules and the increase of       
general tariffs 
 
While awaiting the introduction of the new anti-dumping rules, Kenya can adopt the intra- 
regional anti-dumping rules of the COMESA which appear to be identical to the WTO’s ADA. 
In comparison to the EAC rules, the COMESA provides a broader cover in terms of third parties 
who are suspected of this unfair practice.
572
   
 
Another alternative would be for Kenya to increase the general tariffs within the WTO limits, if 
it has flexibility in this respect. Since the GATT was founded in 1947, applied tariffs have been 
dramatically reduced across the world. However, with reference to developing countries the 
difference between the bound tariffs and actually applied tariffs remains high. In Africa, 75-80 
per cent of tariffs lines are not bound, meaning that most tariffs could be raised without violating 
the WTO rules.
573
 In response to the dumping practice, the Department of Trade and Industry 
can encourage companies in strategic industries to apply for tariff increases to protect them from 
cheap imports. South Africa has recently increased the general tariffs on chicken imports in 
response to dumping of chicken from Brazil instead of imposing anti-dumping duties.
574
 This 
tariff rise has been used by other countries in Africa as an alternative to trade remedies.  
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5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa has been an old user of anti-dumping legislation and is an example to other 
countries. However, its anti-dumping regulations, just like those of the EU or the US, are not 
perfect. This research discussed some of the problems of its anti-dumping laws and compared 
them to those of the WTO’s ADA. To a large extent they are in harmony with the ADA, 
although there is still some development to be achieved, as shown in this mini-thesis, such as, the 
public interest clause and the issue of confidentiality. As regards the public interest provision, 
similar to the recommendations for Kenya, SA should be urged to promulgate this clause so as to 
have a ‘safety valve’575  in case it does not want to impose an anti-dumping measure, since it is 
not always desirable to impose duties. 
 
Confidentiality is a problem expressed by many interested parties. In South Africa the ITAA 
allows parties to claim confidentiality on condition that they submit non-confidential summaries 
of all the sensitive information.  The ITAC then has to determine if the information is 
confidential in the true sense. The problem arises in practice as the ITAC treats too much 
information as confidential; consequently the interested parties are sometimes not in a position to 
defend themselves adequately. This research recommends that SA look into the systems of the 
USA and Canada which are considered efficient, though complicated, in this regard. The 
information submitted by one party can be accessed by the attorneys of the other party on 
condition that they do not disclose the information to their clients. However, they may use it to 
double-check the accuracy of the information and the use thereof.
576
 
 
Most of the other issues relate to practice: what is provided for in the legislation is by-passed by 
the investigating authorities. These include  irregularities in relation to the following: when 
establishing fair comparison appropriate due allowances should be made as required by the 
regulations; upholding the evidentiary rights of interested parties during an investigation; 
updating data sets; and ensuring that all information concerning preliminary and final outcomes 
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are provided for. By addressing these concerns, its anti-dumping laws will be more transparent 
and reliable in future. A refined anti-dumping instrument will assist South Africa’s industries to 
improve their competitiveness and at the same time make sure that exporters do not view the 
country as a dumping ground.
577
 
 
5.4 FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
The purpose of this mini-thesis was to examine the WTO rules and ADA and their application, 
as well as to analyse the anti-dumping legal and institutional frameworks in South Africa and 
Kenya. With that purpose in mind, the thesis showed that Kenya’s legal framework is unclear, 
weak, and in violation of the ADA, whereas it’s institutional framework is almost non-existent. 
South Africa which has had a long history of the use of anti-dumping laws was used as an 
example for Kenya to provide lessons as it endeavours to develop its own regime. From its 
experience it has shown the importances of having these laws resemble those of Art VI of the 
GATT 1994 and the significance of having an administrating agency to implement and ensure 
that the measures are fulfilled to achieve success. In addition, to a small extent this thesis also 
pointed out some problem areas of the South African system, to which Kenya should pay 
attention to learn from and to avoid making similar errors.  
 
Under liberalisation and unfair trade practices, anti-dumping laws are important to Kenya for 
protection of its domestic industries and the economy at large. However, clear procedures must 
be established to improve transparency and predictability, and to show compliance with the rule 
of law, to prevent legal battles in the WTO. The motivation of having this tool should go hand in 
hand with the recommendations provided by this mini-thesis to assist in the actualisation of the 
goal to develop the current anti-dumping laws. 
 
Word count: 37,407. 
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